This deliverable is part of a project that has received funding from the ECSEL JU under grant agreement No 692474. This Joint Undertaking receives support from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme and from Spain, Czech Republic, Germany, Sweden, Italy, United Kingdom and France.
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<th>Names</th>
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Executive Summary

The deliverable D3.6 “Prototype for Architecture-Driven Assurance (c)” is the last output of the AMASS task T3.3 Implementation for Architecture-driven Assurance, whose objective is the development of a tooling framework to support architecture-driven assurance. D3.6 is the evolution of D3.5, which described the second prototype, the sections modified with respect to D3.5 have been marked with (*) in the headlines.

AMASS task T3.3 has three prototype iterations, described in D3.4 [20], D3.5 [21] and D3.6 (this document). This deliverable reports the status of the aforementioned tooling framework for the final prototype release (Prototype P2), in particular for what regards the system component specification and the tooling framework supporting architecture-driven assurance, by describing the supported functionalities and the details about implementation.

This deliverable takes into account the work performed in the other project work-packages, mainly WP2, WP4, WP5 and WP6 because they have strong dependencies with T3.3. Indeed, in this deliverable a set of functionalities regarding the system component specification has been selected from the AMASS deliverable D2.1 “Business cases and high-level requirements” [18]. D3.6 describes the technologies that allow the implementation of all selected functionality also covering requirements which have not been implemented in previous prototype iterations.

The logical structural view of the AMASS reference tool architecture elaborated in the “AMASS Reference Architecture” deliverables, D2.3 [6] and D2.4 [7], have also been considered in this deliverable; in particular physical components like CHESS and its contract editing functionality have been successfully mapped to the logical tool components Component Editor and Contract Editor.

WP4 and WP5 results have been particularly useful in guiding the argumentation and evidence metamodel specification; importantly, system architecture-related information can now be traced to the argumentation and evidence models.

The deliverable D3.6 “Prototype for architecture-driven assurance (c)” is the final evolution of this deliverable; in particular, D3.6 documents the final state of the tooling framework’s implementation supporting architecture-driven assurance using contract based design.
1. Introduction (*)

The AMASS approach focuses on the development and consolidation of an open and holistic assurance and certification framework for Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), which constitutes the evolution of the OPENCOSS\(^1\) and SafeCer\(^2\) approaches towards an architecture-driven, multi-concern assurance, and seamlessly interoperable tool platform.

The AMASS tangible expected results are:

a) The **AMASS Reference Tool Architecture**, which will extend the OPENCOSS and SafeCer conceptual, modelling and methodological frameworks for architecture-driven and multi-concern assurance, as well as for further cross-domain and intra-domain reuse capabilities and seamless interoperability mechanisms (e.g. based on Open Services for Lifecycle Collaboration (OSLC)\(^3\) specifications).

b) The **AMASS Open Tool Platform**, which will correspond to a collaborative tool environment supporting CPS assurance and certification. This platform represents a concrete implementation of the AMASS Reference Tool Architecture, with a capability for evolution and adaptation, which will be released as an open technological solution by the AMASS project. AMASS openness is based on both standard OSLC Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) with external tools (e.g. engineering tools including V&V tools) and on open-source release of the AMASS building blocks.

c) The **Open AMASS Community**, which will manage the project outcomes for maintenance, evolution and industrialization. The Open Community will be supported by a governance board, and by rules, policies, and quality models. This includes support for AMASS base tools (tool infrastructure for database and access management, among others) and extension tools (enriching AMASS functionality). As Eclipse Foundation is part of the AMASS consortium, the Polarsys/Eclipse community\(^4\) is a strong candidate to host AMASS (See D7.3 [27], D7.5 [28] and D7.6 [29] for further details).

To achieve the AMASS results, as depicted in Figure 1, the multiple challenges and corresponding project scientific and technical objectives are addressed by different work-packages.

---

1. [www.opencoss-project.eu](http://www.opencoss-project.eu)
2. [https://artemis-ia.eu/project/40-nsafecer.html](https://artemis-ia.eu/project/40-nsafecer.html)
3. [https://open-services.net](https://open-services.net)
4. [www.polarsys.org](http://www.polarsys.org)
Since AMASS targets ambitious objectives related to architecture-driven assurance, multi-concern assurance, seamless interoperability support and cross-domain and intra domain assurance reuse, the AMASS Consortium has decided to follow an incremental approach by developing rapid and early prototypes.

The benefits of following a prototyping approach are:

- Better assessment of ideas by focusing on a few aspects of the solution.
- Ability to change critical decisions by using practical and industrial feedback (case studies).

AMASS has planned three prototype iterations:

1. During the **first prototyping** iteration (Prototype Core), the AMASS Platform Basic Building Blocks, are aligned, merged and consolidated at Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 4 (technology validated in laboratory).
2. During the **second prototyping** iteration (Prototype P1), the single AMASS-specific Building Blocks will be developed and benchmarked at TRL 4.
3. Finally, at the **third prototyping** iteration (Prototype P2), all AMASS building blocks will be integrated in a comprehensive toolset operating at TRL 5 (technology validated in relevant environment).

Each of these iterations has the following three prototyping dimensions:

- **Conceptual/research development**: development of solutions from a conceptual perspective.
- **Tool development**: development of tools implementing conceptual solutions.
- **Case study development**: development of industrial case studies using the conceptual and tooling solutions.
As part of the Prototype P2, WP3 is responsible for driving the architecture specification in order to design and implement the basic building block called “System Component Specification” (see Figure 1). This part of the AMASS platform manages component and contract-based design (see D3.1 [10] Section 3.1.1).

This deliverable follows the outcomes of D3.5 [21], which comprised a thorough report on the tool development results of the “System Component Specification” basic building block. It presents in detail the pieces of functionality implemented in the AMASS platform tools, their software architecture, the technology used, and some source code references. In that framework, D3.6 strongly focuses on the integration of different approaches and ideas into one unified AMASS tooling framework supporting architecture-driven assurance.

Other important parts of the D3.6 document are:

- Description of the AMASS Platform tools for the final prototype
- Finalized User Manuals and installation Instructions
- Source code description
2. Implemented Functionality

2.1 Scope (*)

The scope for the third prototype iteration is the provision of modelling tools for system component specification, including a contract-based approach and the link with the assurance case specification. The main scope is highlighted with red rectangles on Figure 2, which shows the general layered structure of the AMASS platform (from AMASS deliverable D2.3 [19]).

Figure 2. Layered structure of AMASS tool modules

Figure 3 illustrates the component decomposition of these tools based on the design specification documented in deliverable D3.3 [16].
The System component specification enables the design of: the overall architecture, each single component and the requirements. Moreover, it provides features of contract editing. The architecture driven assurance is decomposed in different modules; the System Architecture Modelling for Assurance module that interacts with the External Design Tools, the V&V-based Assurance Impact Assessment module that provides V&V analysis invoking external V&V tools, the Contract-based Assurance Composition that provides contact-based features, and the Assurance Patterns Library Management module that implements the concept of assurance pattern.

2.2 Implemented Requirements (*)

From the requirements point of view, this last prototype iteration focuses on a set of AMASS requirements as defined in the AMASS deliverable D2.1 “Business cases and high-level requirements” [18]. Table 1 shows all relevant requirements which the final prototype shall implement. Even though some of the requirements are still pending or in development at the release of this document, the final prototype will cover all of them.
Table 1. Requirements implemented in the final prototype of the AMASS platform (P2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP3_APL_001</td>
<td>Drag and drop an architectural pattern</td>
<td>The system shall be able to instantiate in the component model and architectural pattern selected from the list of patterns stored</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>Papyrus</td>
<td>INT, TEC, CEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_APL_002</td>
<td>Edit an architectural pattern</td>
<td>The system should be able to edit, store and retrieve architectural patterns</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>Papyrus</td>
<td>INT, TEC, CEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_APL_003</td>
<td>Use of architectural patterns at different levels</td>
<td>The system shall be able to apply to the component model architectural patterns at different levels: AUTOSAR, IMA, Safety/Security Mechanisms (security controls)</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>Papyrus</td>
<td>INT, TEC, CEA (B&amp;M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_APL_005</td>
<td>Generation of argumentation fragments from architectural patterns/decisions</td>
<td>The system shall be able to generate arguments fragments based on the usage of specific architectural patterns in the component model</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>OpenCert</td>
<td>TEC, CEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_001</td>
<td>Validate composition of components by validating their contracts</td>
<td>The system shall be able to validate the composition of components by supporting the validation of their contracts, analysing the relationship among assumptions and guarantees</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, OCRA</td>
<td>FBK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_002</td>
<td>Assign contract to component</td>
<td>The system shall allow to associate a contract to a component. Then, the system shall allow to drop a contract from a component</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, SAVONA</td>
<td>MDH, FBK, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_003</td>
<td>Structure properties into contracts (assumptions/guarantees)</td>
<td>The system shall be able to support the extraction of assumptions and guarantees to be used in component contracts based on component properties</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS/SAVONA</td>
<td>FBK, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_004</td>
<td>Specify contract refinement</td>
<td>The system shall enable users to specify the refinement of the contract along the hierarchical component’s architecture</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS/SAVONA</td>
<td>FBK, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_005</td>
<td>General management of contract-component assignments</td>
<td>The system should enable users to have a view of the association between contracts and components for the entire system architecture (thus, not only a view on the single contract assignment for each component)</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>INT, FBK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_006</td>
<td>Refinement-based overview</td>
<td>The system should enable users to have a hierarchical view of the contract refinements along the system architecture</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, SAVONA</td>
<td>FBK, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirement No</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Tools</td>
<td>Involved Partners</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_007</td>
<td>Overview of check refinements results</td>
<td>The system should enable users to have an overview in terms of status of check refinement of all the defined contracts.</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>FBK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_008</td>
<td>Contract-based validation and verification</td>
<td>The system must provide support for contract-based system validation and verification, including refinement checking, compositional verification of behavioural models, contract-based fault-tree generation</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>FBK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_009</td>
<td>Improvement of Contract definition process</td>
<td>The operation of contract definition should be improved in terms of time spent.</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, SAVONA</td>
<td>FBK, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_011</td>
<td>Overview of contract-based validation for behavioural models</td>
<td>The system could enable users to have an overview of the validation of a contract over a state-machine. In case of failure, the system could enable users to have information about the trace that does not fulfil the contract.</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>FBK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_012</td>
<td>Browse Contract status</td>
<td>The user shall be able to browse the contracts associated within a component and their status (fulfilled or not)</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>INT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_013</td>
<td>Specify contracts defining the assumption and the guarantee elements</td>
<td>The system shall provide the capability to create a contract defining two new properties (assumptions/guarantees) implicitly associated to that contract.</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>INT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_014</td>
<td>Drop contract from component</td>
<td>The system shall allow to drop a contract from a component</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, SAVONA</td>
<td>INT, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_015</td>
<td>Reassign contract to component</td>
<td>The system shall allow to substitute the already assigned contract to a component with another contract</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>INT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SAM_001</td>
<td>Trace component with assurance assets</td>
<td>The supplier of a component shall be able to trace all the assurance information with the specific component</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CAPRA</td>
<td>INT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SAM_002</td>
<td>Impact assessment if the component changes</td>
<td>The system shall provide the capability for a component change impact analysis</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>CAPRA</td>
<td>B&amp;M, INT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SAM_003</td>
<td>Compare different architectures according to different concerns which haven’t been specified before</td>
<td>The system shall be able to compare different system architectures based on predefined criteria, like dependability or timing concerns</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>FBK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirement No</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Tools</td>
<td>Involved Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SAM_004</td>
<td>Integration with external modelling tools</td>
<td>The system could interact with external tools for system design and development (e.g., Rhapsody, AutoFocus, Compass) to get the system architecture.</td>
<td></td>
<td>CHESS, Papyrus</td>
<td>INT, UC3, TRC, FBK, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SC_001</td>
<td>System abstraction levels</td>
<td>The user shall be able to browse along the different abstractions levels (system, subsystem, component)</td>
<td></td>
<td>CHESS, SAVONA</td>
<td>INT, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SC_002</td>
<td>System abstraction levels</td>
<td>The user shall be able to move and edit along the different abstractions levels (system, subsystem, component)</td>
<td></td>
<td>CHESS, SAVONA</td>
<td>INT, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SC_003</td>
<td>Modelling languages for component model</td>
<td>The system shall be able to support different modelling languages to model the component/Subsystem/system</td>
<td></td>
<td>CHESS, OCRA, SAVONA, Papyrus</td>
<td>FBK, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SC_004</td>
<td>Formalize requirements with formal properties</td>
<td>The system shall be able to specify requirements about a component in a formal way</td>
<td></td>
<td>CHESS, SAVONA</td>
<td>INT, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SC_005</td>
<td>Requirements allocation</td>
<td>The system shall provide the capability for allocating requirements to parts of the component model. More in general, requirements traceability shall be enabled.</td>
<td></td>
<td>CHESS, Papyrus, CAPRA</td>
<td>INT, KMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SC_006</td>
<td>Specify component behavioural model (state machines)</td>
<td>The system shall be able to specify the component behavioural model</td>
<td></td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>FBK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SC_007</td>
<td>Fault injection (include faulty behaviour of a component)</td>
<td>The system shall have fault injection capabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>CHESS, SABOTAGE</td>
<td>INT, TEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_001</td>
<td>Traceability between different kinds of V&amp;V evidence</td>
<td>The system shall provide the ability to trace immediate evidence (obtained during the execution of the left-hand side of the V-model) with direct evidence (obtained during the execution of the right-hand side of the V-model). For instance: a contract-based, component-based specification should be traced with the corresponding analysis-results.</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPRA</td>
<td>INT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_002</td>
<td>Trace model-to-model transformation</td>
<td>The system shall be able to trace all component model transformations executed during V&amp;V model-based analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPRA</td>
<td>INT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_003</td>
<td>Validate requirements checking consistency, redundancy, ... on formal properties</td>
<td>The system shall be able to validate formal requirements/properties</td>
<td></td>
<td>CHESS, OCRA, V&amp;V Manager</td>
<td>FBK, HON, UOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_004</td>
<td>Trace requirements validation checks</td>
<td>The system shall be able to trace requirements validations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Papyrus, CAPRA</td>
<td>INT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirement No</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Tools</td>
<td>Involved Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_005</td>
<td>Verify (model checking) state machines</td>
<td>The system shall be able to verify the component behavioural model match with the specification</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, NuXmv, V&amp;VManager</td>
<td>FBK, HON, UOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_006</td>
<td>Automatic provision of HARA/TARA-artifacts</td>
<td>The system shall provide the capability for automating HARA (Hazard Analysis Risk Assessment)/TARA (Threat Assessment &amp; Remediation Analysis)-related artefacts (e.g., FTA, FMEA, attack trees).</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>MediniAnalyzer, SafetyArchitect, CHESS</td>
<td>B&amp;M, KMT, A4T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_007</td>
<td>Generation of reports about system description/verification results ...</td>
<td>The system shall generate reports about system/subsystem/component verification results</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>CHESS, V&amp;VManager</td>
<td>FBK, HON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_010</td>
<td>Model-based safety analysis</td>
<td>The system shall allow the user to generate fault trees and FMEA tables from the behavioural model and the fault injection</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>CHESS, XSAP</td>
<td>INT, FBK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_011</td>
<td>Simulation-based Fault Injection</td>
<td>The system should allow the user to generate fault injection simulations from the fault trees and FMEA tables</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>SABOTAGE</td>
<td>TEC, AIT, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_012</td>
<td>Design Space Exploration</td>
<td>The system could support the design space exploration of a system for a certain safety/security criticality level</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>FBK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each requirement together with the implementation completed so far to implement the requirement is briefly outlined in the following sections.

### 2.2.1 System Component Specification

#### 2.2.1.1 System Architecture Editor (*)

**Table 2. Requirements implemented in the System Architecture Editor**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SC_001</td>
<td>System abstraction levels</td>
<td>The user shall be able to browse along the different abstractions levels (system, subsystem, component)</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, SAVONA</td>
<td>INT, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SC_002</td>
<td>System abstraction levels</td>
<td>The user shall be able to move and edit along the different abstractions levels (system, subsystem, component)</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, SAVONA</td>
<td>INT, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SC_003</td>
<td>Modelling languages for component model</td>
<td>The system shall be able to support different modelling languages to model the component/Subsystem/system</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, OCRA, SAVONA, Papyrus</td>
<td>FBK, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
System architecture specification is supported by the Papyrus UML/SysML editor [5]. The selection of UML/SysML has been driven by the wide adoption of these modelling languages in the industry in different domains. Then, the selection of the Papyrus UML/SysML editor has been driven by the fact that Papyrus is an open source tool with very strict adherence to the OMG standards definition and very good support for customization (i.e. profiling), with also different successfully use case stories in the industry already available5. In particular, recently the Papyrus Industry Consortium has been created to support a model-based engineering platform based on the domain specific and modelling capabilities of the Eclipse Papyrus family of products. It is worth noting that Papyrus also has integration facilities with other tools, such as the commercial IBM UML Rhapsody tool; in addition, it supports the XMI OMG standard [9] for the interchange of UML models between UML tools.

Through the Papyrus editor (see Figure 4), SysML Blocks and UML Components can be used to model the architectural entities as required by the AMASS component meta-model definition (see D2.4 [7]). Decomposition of blocks/components into sub-blocks/sub-components can be modelled by using internal block diagrams or composite structure diagrams. Both the Papyrus Editor and other AMASS components are under the same Open Source license, which supports the reuse of these previous results within the AMASS platform.

Information about the functional behaviour of a given component/block can be provided through state machine diagrams.

The resulting UML/SysML models and diagrams are stored in individual files in the Eclipse workspace.

5 [https://www.eclipse.org/papyrus/testimonials.html](https://www.eclipse.org/papyrus/testimonials.html)
The Papyrus UML editor supports the definition and application of UML profiles. In AMASS, the Papyrus tool is used together with the CHESS profile extension [3]; in particular CHESS is used here as extension of the UML and SysML modelling languages to allow the modelling of contracts, as explained in the following sections, according to the AMASS component meta-model needs (see D2.4 [7]).

CHESS also provides extension to the Papyrus tool, for instance by adding dedicated diagram palettes to facilitate the creation of the CHESS entities, or by adding a dedicated property tabs view for editing CHESS entities properties (see Section 0).

For the GUI perspective, the CHESS theme enriches UML and SysML diagrams with useful information for the user, such as multiplicity attributes for ports and components, and guard expressions in state machines. The user may also hide graphical elements that cause visual clutter such as the stereotypes applied to the CHESS entities. CHESS enables the automatic generation of SysML diagrams from the CHESS model and provides a layout facility for arranging the diagram elements based on the Eclipse Layout Kernel (ELK)[12].

It is worth noting that the CHESS profile also provides other modelling capabilities, such as the dependability profile [11] for failure modelling and specific support for timing properties (see Section 0 about CHESS features). Moreover, CHESS provides a methodology for the design, verification and implementation of CPS SW systems [1]. The CHESS profile follows the same licensing approach as Papyrus and other AMASS components, which supports the easy integration of the developments from the intellectual property perspective.
2.2.1.1 Easy System Architecture Modelling with SAVONA (*)

As Papyrus and CHESS can be used for various different modelling activities their options and possibilities might overcome an average system engineer without an extensive background on applying SysML. It has been found that a restricted user interface, which only allows meaningful actions would result in a higher user acceptance. SAVONA has been developed to support system engineers in creating static system architectures in SysML.

![Diagram of SysML Internal Block Diagram (IBD)](image)

**Figure 5.** SysML IBD showing multiple system layers

The SysML Internal Block Diagram (IBD) has been chosen as the main diagram type for designing the systems architecture in SAVONA, as it allows an intuitive understanding of the model through multiple system layers. Mechanisms have been added that generate whitebox diagrams of selected system blocks, which can automatically be synchronized on model changes. This enables an effortless display of the model’s current design status.

The Model Explorer is customized to only show relevant model elements such as blocks, parts, ports, signals and diagrams. Its context menu (see Figure 6) has been revised to only allow applicable copy/paste operations and to create new model elements and diagrams.

![Revised Context Menu of the Model Explorer](image)

**Figure 6.** Revised Context Menu of the Model Explorer
SAVONA also allows a tabular view of model elements. Such Model Tables can be viewed for each SysML block, containing the parts, ports and signals of the block. Figure 7 shows the Signals-tab containing all signals of the selected block. Model element names and descriptions can be edited directly inside the model table.

![Figure 7. Model Table showing all signals of a SysML Block](image)

The custom Properties View in SAVONA combines all relevant information for each model element. Element descriptions can be formatted and may contain hyperlinks as shown in Figure 8. The view also contains sections for specifying contracts, which is further described in section 2.2.1.5.1.

![Figure 8. Properties View in SAVONA](image)

Modelling a system’s architecture often results in large diagrams that are difficult to lay out by hand. Based on the Eclipse Layout Kernel (ELK)[12] SAVONA offers the automatic layout of SysML IBD, which simplifies the laying out of new diagrams or parts of it. Since SAVONA is also based on Papyrus it offers possibilities for interoperability to the AMASS Platform / CHESS. A CHESS export function allows conversion of the SAVONA model into a CHESS model (see Figure 9). That way, the initial architecture design can be performed in SAVONA and later be reopened in CHESS to perform various V&V activities on the model without any loss of information.
2.2.1.2 Formalize Requirements with Formal Properties (*)

Table 3. Requirements regarding the formalization of system requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SC_004</td>
<td>Formalize requirements with formal properties</td>
<td>The system shall be able to specify requirements about a component in a formal way</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, SAVONA</td>
<td>INT, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SC_005</td>
<td>Requirements allocation</td>
<td>The system shall provide the capability for allocating requirements to parts of the component model. More in general, requirements traceability shall be enabled.</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, Papyrus, CAPRA</td>
<td>INT, KMT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Requirements can be modelled in Papyrus using the SysML profile; indeed, SysML comes with the dedicated Requirement stereotype (see Figure 10) which can be managed through Requirement Diagrams. The availability of system requirements represented in the model allows the user to model their traceability to the different parts of the system model. In particular, by using the SysML profile, requirements can be traced to the entities of the architecture, by using the Satisfy link defined by SysML. In this way requirements traceability (see e.g. [8]), which is an important quality factor to be guaranteed while building systems, can be obtained while using model-driven support.

In AMASS, a formal property represents a distinct entity which is used to provide a formal description of a given system requirement, the latter usually described using informal textual language.

To model formal properties, the CHESS profile defines a construct called FormalProperty as an extension of UML Constraint (see Figure 10). A FormalProperty can be created first in the model and then linked to the requirement that it formalizes; the SysML trace link can be created in the SysML Requirement diagram or through the tabular editor provided by Papyrus. Then the formal description of the requirement is provided by using the specification attribute coming with the FormalProperty entity. This

6 [https://wiki.eclipse.org/Papyrus_User_Guide/Table_Documentation](https://wiki.eclipse.org/Papyrus_User_Guide/Table_Documentation)
attribute can refer to the UML OpaqueExpression element that contains language-specific texts to express one formal property in different modelling languages.

![Diagram of UML OpaqueExpression](image)

**Figure 10. Modelling FormalProperty**

It is worth noting here that the CHESS profile does not force the usage of a particular formal language; the choice of the formal language to be adopted for the formalization of requirements is made by the modeller, typically according to the adopted process/methodology. CHESS currently supports integration with the OCRA contract specification language\(^7\); in particular, through the CHESS Contract plugins explained in Section 0 it is possible to verify formal properties with respect to OCRA syntax.

---

\(^7\) [https://ocra.fbk.eu](https://ocra.fbk.eu)
2.2.1.3 Semi-Formal Requirement Definition

As users might not be familiar with formal expressions to define contracts, we adopted a custom text-based editor with syntax checks and auto-completion, and a wizard to set up assertions with pre-defined templates for the most common assertion patterns.

In the following paragraphs we explain both concepts in detail.

2.2.1.3.1 Assertion Wizard

As applying a template language can be quite difficult without any guidelines, we decided to implement a wizard that guides the user through the process of choosing and filling out an appropriate pattern structure for their statement. The first page of the wizard shows the user the three main pattern types of our template language: Global Invariant Pattern, Simultaneity Pattern, and Trigger-Reaction Pattern (see Figure 11). We have added a short description and an example for each one so that it is easier for the user to decide.

After selecting the main pattern type, several possible pattern instances of the type are presented to the user. Each of them features an example to demonstrate a possible application (see Figure 12). If an appropriate pattern instance is chosen, the user will be directed to the last page of the wizard, where the patterns construct needs to be customized. The user can now replace non-terminals by simply clicking on them. A drop-down menu shows possible substitutions and the option to use a macro. If a terminal that must be replaced by an event name is selected, a list containing all event interface names of the currently selected component appears. That way the user can only choose and use model elements that are in scope (see Figure 13). The same holds for terminals that must be replaced by variable names except that the suggested names come from all available ports except the event ports. We also provide a set of time units the user can choose from when specifying timed behaviour. Only if no non-terminals remain in the pattern instance and all terminals are replaced by actual interface names, values, units, etc., can the assertion be assigned to a selected component. Otherwise, the wizard will give a hint to the user about the remaining non-terminals or terminals.
Figure 11. First step in the Assertion-Wizard: Select a General Pattern Type to formulate an assertion. Each selection features a short description and example to offer the user an easy decision.

Figure 12. Second step in the Assertion-Wizard: Choose a pattern instantiation of the previously selected general pattern type.
2.2.1.3.2 Assertion Editor (*)

If the user has already gathered some experience with our template language, the use of the Assertion Wizard might include too many unnecessary steps to formulate a valid assertion. The right pattern structure is already known by the user, so going through the wizard seems inefficient. With the Assertion Editor, we allow the user to directly type in the desired assertion. As writing valid assertions free-hand can be difficult and error-prone, we offer support with an online syntax check and suggestions for auto-completion of the statement, as one might expect from various programming IDEs. Figure 14 shows the Assertion Editor suggesting valid possibilities to continue the current statement.

We chose Xtext as the technology to base our text editor on. That allowed us to easily implement the editor by providing the BNF in the Xtext grammar format and slightly adjusting the auto-completion suggestions. The rest was automated by the code generation feature of Xtext. Another important reason for choosing Xtext is that it features methods to automatically translate expressions from one language to another. This can be used later to translate our template expressions into a formal language expression.

![Assertion Editor](image)

**Figure 13.** Last step of the Assertion-Wizard: Refine the pattern instance with names of available model elements. Only element names which are valid for the corresponding placeholder can be used.

**Figure 14.** Pattern-suggestion feature of the Assertion Editor

Assertions which are created using the Assertion Wizard or Editor were planned to be automatically translated to formal language expression such as LTL. Since the completion of other features had a higher...
priority than this one, we could not manage to complete its implementation on time. This might be
unfortunate from a research perspective but acceptable from the project’s perspective since there were no
requirements requesting this feature.

2.2.1.3.3 Macro Definition

Sometimes it is unavoidable to use complex expressions within a pattern language, where a natural
language expression would be much shorter or easier to read and understand. That is why we introduce the
concept of Macros, which allows the use of natural language expressions within our pattern language. The
user defines a meaning for each natural language phrase by specifying a corresponding pattern language
expression. This way we ensure that even with natural language elements, all built expressions within our
pattern language have unambiguous semantics.

As Macros are used to create assertions, they can be created on the same types of model elements. To add
a new macro, click the Add-Button on the upper right-hand corner of the Macro Section (see Figure 15).

![Figure 15. Macros Section of the Properties View in SAVONA](image)

On the first wizard page, a keyword to define a macro for is selected (see Figure 16). The left side of the
wizard shows possible replacements for the currently selected keyword. Additionally, the user sets the
macro name.

Macros can only replace a non-terminal from the (semi-) formal syntax, as the semantics are only
guaranteed to be specified on that level. Terminals (such as port names) can have different meanings due
to their context and can therefore not be used as a macro definition.

The subsequent macro wizard pages allow the customization of the selected keyword. As it uses the same
page layout as the Assertion Wizard, please refer to the description of the Assertion Wizard for detailed
information.
2.2.1.3.4 Data Dictionary (*)

When specifying (semi-)formal assertions, there needs to be a way to define custom variables such as constants or units. SAVONA offers a Data Dictionary View (see Figure 17) where several model elements can be defined that can later be used within the definition of assertions:

- **Enumerations** and **Enumeration Members** can be defined
- **Constants** of a certain type (Integer, String, etc.) with or without a Unit
- **Units** (a predefined set of Units is available from start-up)
- **Datatypes** to use as types on ports (a predefined set of Units is available from start-up)
Each SAVONA project/model features one **Global Data Dictionary** whose entries are available through the entire project. Additionally, each component type (block) has its own **Local Data Dictionary** whose entries are only available to this exact same component and its owned ports.

The entries of the Data Dictionary are also exported during the CHESS Export. To allow CHESS to properly interpret the Data Dictionary and its entries, the Data Dictionary Papyrus profile is always contained within the exported model files.

### 2.2.1.4 Structure Properties into Contracts

**Table 4. Requirements covering the structure of contracts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_003</td>
<td>Structure properties into contracts (assumptions/guarantees)</td>
<td>The system shall be able to support the extraction of assumptions and guarantees to be used in component contracts based on component properties</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS/SAVONA</td>
<td>FBK, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The CHESS profile supports the modelling of weak and strong contracts to support contract-based design (the reader can refer to AMASS D3.1 [10] for an introduction to weak and strong contracts and contract-based design).

**Contracts** are available in the CHESS profile as a special kind of classifiers (i.e. an entity used to describe instance-level entities of the same kind). Contracts can be created in UML class, component, or SysML block diagrams. A Contract comes with two attributes representing the **assumption** and **guarantee** formal properties.

By using the CHESS Papyrus extension, when a Contract is created in the model, the tool automatically creates a pair of empty `FormalProperties` to represent the assumption and guarantee of the Contract. Alternatively, a given `FormalProperty` available in the model before the creation of the Contract can later be assigned to the Contract itself, as assumption or guarantee.

Figure 18 below shows an example of Contract and FormalProperty modelling; the figure shows the Assume and Guarantee attributes owned by the Contract, which in the example are bounded to the represented `FormalProperty`. A link between the Contract and the `FormalProperty` is also depicted.
2.2.1.5 Assign Contract to Component (*)

Table 5. Requirements covering contract management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_002</td>
<td>Assign contract to component</td>
<td>The system shall allow to associate a contract to a component. Then, the system shall allow to drop a contract from a component</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, SAVONA</td>
<td>MDH, FBK, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_003</td>
<td>Structure properties into contracts (assumptions/guarantees)</td>
<td>The system shall be able to support the extraction of assumptions and guarantees to be used in component contracts based on component properties</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS/SAVONA</td>
<td>FBK, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_005</td>
<td>General management of contract-component assignments</td>
<td>The system should enable users to have a view of the association between contracts and components for the entire system architecture (thus, not only a view on the single contract assignment for each component)</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>INT, FBK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_009</td>
<td>Improvement of Contract definition process</td>
<td>The operation of contract definition should be improved in terms of time spent.</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, SAVONA</td>
<td>FBK, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_013</td>
<td>Specify contracts defining the assumption and the guarantee elements</td>
<td>The system shall provide the capability to create a contract defining two new properties (assumptions/guarantees) implicitly associated to that contract.</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>INT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In CHESS, a contract can be assigned to a component by instantiating the contract in the component itself. The instantiation is realized by creating for a component a special kind of property, called `ContractProperty` which is typed with the given contract. This allows to potentially reuse the same contract in different contexts/systems (as analogous to the practice of sharing requirements across projects, i.e. software/system requirements reuse).

It is possible to first create the contract and then assign it to a component. The AMASS prototype enables also the possibility to automatically create a contract when a `ContractProperty` is created, see [21]. In this case, the association contract-component is 1 to 1. The first advantage is that, during the editing of the contract, the content assist supports the user suggesting which are the ports and the attributes name of the component. The second advantage is that, the operation of contract definition is improved in terms of time spent.

![Question](image)

**Figure 19.** After the creation of a `ContractProperty`, a Popup appears to decide whether a new contract has to be created or an existing one has to be instantiated.

`ContractProperty` has also an attribute that allows specifying whether the associated Contract has to be applied to the Component/Block according to the weak or strong semantics\(^8\) [10].

As example, Figure 20 shows the `criticalValuesManaged` `ContractProperty` owned by the `FunctionalSystem` Block (the `ContractProperty` is shown in the diagram in the `Constraint` compartment of the Block). The `criticalValuesManaged` property is typed as `CriticalValuesManaged` Contract, the latter is also represented in the diagram. The `criticalValuesManaged` property represents the association of the `CriticalValuesManaged` Contract to the `FunctionalSystem` Block.

---

\(^8\) As discussed [10], while strong assumptions define compatible environments in which the component/block can be used, weak assumptions define specific contexts where additional information is available. Hence, a component/block should never be used in a context where some strong assumptions are violated, but if some weak assumptions do not hold, it just means that the corresponding guarantees cannot be relied on.
2.2.1.5.1 Contract Definition in SAVONA (*)

To specify a contract within SAVONA, assertions must be gathered that are later used either as assumptions or guarantees. The Assertions Section of the Properties View (see Figure 21) shows assertions that are defined for the currently selected SysML block, interface or connector.

As contracts can only be defined on SysML blocks via the Contracts Section (see Figure 22), the Contracts section shows an overview of all contracts assigned to the currently selected type and allows the editing, creation and deletion of contracts.
In the Contracts Section, contracts can be collapsed or expanded as shown in Figure 23, allowing a clean overview of the existing contracts.

When defining a new contract in SAVONA, the Contract Wizard is used to ease the process of assigning assertions as assumptions or guarantees. Previously defined assertions can be used to create a contract for a component. The wizard offers assertions that are defined on the currently selected SysML block and the owned ports of the block (see Figure 24).

To use one of the offered assertions in a contract, simply assign a type (either assumption or guarantee) to it. At least one guarantee is needed to create a contract. Multiple assumptions as well as multiple
2.2.1.6 Contract Refinement

Table 6. Requirements covering contract refinement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_004</td>
<td>Specify contract refinement</td>
<td>The system shall enable users to specify the refinement of the contract along the hierarchical component’s architecture</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS/SAV/ONA</td>
<td>FBK, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_006</td>
<td>Refinement-based overview</td>
<td>The system should enable users to have a hierarchical view of the contract refinements along the system architecture</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, SAVONA</td>
<td>FBK, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The CHESS profile allows the modelling of contract refinement and decomposition along the refinement and decomposition of the architectural entities, the latter provided through UML composite structural diagrams or SysML block definition diagrams. In particular, contract instances play a key role during the refinement specification. Indeed, contracts refinement is modelled for contract instances, not for the Contracts entities; this is because the same Contract can be reused in several contexts (i.e. instantiated in several Components/Blocks), and for each context the refinement of the same Contract could be different. So, through the CHESS profile, it is possible to model how a given contract instance is refined by a set of other contract instances.

In practice, given a contract instance C assigned to a component A, and given the decomposition of A into subcomponents (A₁,...,Aₙ) and the contracts instances assigned to each subcomponent (C₁<₁...,Cₙ<₁j>), it is possible to model how C is decomposed by (a subset of) (C₁<₁...,Cₙ<₁j>); it is worth noting that contracts decomposition can then be modelled for the subcomponents as well, so to have multiple levels of contracts decomposition.

2.2.1.7 Modelling Failure Behaviour

Existing support for failure behaviour modelling is available from state-of-the-art projects and modelling tools, like the UML/MARTE dependability profile coming with the CHESS modelling language [3] (see e.g. section 2.2.3.4).

Extension of the aforementioned CHESS dependability profile has been done in AMASS to address security concerns also, as documented in AMASS deliverable D4.3 [24] section 2.1.4.1.

2.2.2 System Architecture Modelling for Assurance

Table 7. Requirements covering architecture modelling for assurance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SAM_001</td>
<td>Trace component with assurance assets</td>
<td>The supplier of a component shall be able to trace all the assurance information with the specific component</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CAPRA</td>
<td>INT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SAM_003</td>
<td>Compare different architectures according to different concerns which haven’t been specified</td>
<td>The system shall be able to compare different system architectures based on predefined criteria, like</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>FBK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 2.2.2.1 Link Architecture-Related Entity to Assurance Case Information (*)

The allowed links between architectural entities and the other parts of the CACM AMASS meta-model are described in the AMASS deliverable D3.3 [16].

As explained in the previous sections, the AMASS component model has been made available as Eclipse plugin as UML/SysML language extended with the CHESS profile for contracts, while the other parts of the CACM (argumentation, evidence, compliance management) are currently implemented as Ecore meta-models\(^9\) (not as UML profile).

Within the UML profile definition, it is not possible to refer to an Ecore entity which is not related to the UML language, so the aforementioned links (e.g. from a CHESS-Contract to an argumentation-Claim) cannot be expressed through the CHESS profile; the links have to be managed with some additional modelling support, as explained below in the text.

One solution could be to use the EAnnotation mechanism available in Ecore: EAnnotation allows to attach extra information to any object available in an Ecore model. In our case, EAnnotation could be created for a UML model entity (for instance a Contract)\(^10\); then EAnnotation could be used to refer to an entity of the CACM defined in some external (to the UML) model (as a Claim in an argumentation model). Figure 25 gives a picture of what has been stated above (CACM model in the figure is intended as the model for argumentation, evidence, and compliance management).

---

\(^9\) Ecore is a model provided by the Eclipse EMF project (https://www.eclipse.org/modeling/emf). Ecore can be used to model the structure of a given domain of data models. Typically, Ecore is referenced as a meta-meta-model; the structure of a given domain of data models is referenced as meta-model, where a model is a concrete instance of this meta-model.

\(^10\) It is worth noting that EAnnotation can be added to UML model entities because UML models in Eclipse are implemented as Ecore models.
However, the solution of using EAnnotation does not allow to formalize the kind of connections that are allowed between the different metamodels.

The solution adopted in AMASS to support links between architectural entities and the other parts of the CACM AMASS meta-model foresees the usage of a dedicated traceability meta-model (see Figure 26). In this way, a link is created according to the traceability meta-model; each link owns a reference to the UML model entity and a reference to the CACM model entity to be associated.

What is worth noting is that the usage of a dedicated traceability meta-model can be made generic in order to support traceability between assurance case information and architecture-related entities specified with other non-UML modelling languages. For instance, by assuming the availability of an Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL)\textsuperscript{11} editor in Eclipse, the same traceability model could be used to create links between AADL entities and argumentation/evidence entities available in the CACM model.

\textsuperscript{11} \url{http://www.aadl.info/aadl/currentsite}
In AMASS we use the Eclipse Capra\textsuperscript{12} tool which offers a framework supporting the solution depicted in Figure 26; see AMASS D5.6 Prototype for seamless interoperability (c) [26] for further details about Capra usage in AMASS.

2.2.2.2 Import System component specification (*)

The third prototype (Prototype P2) enables the import of the system architecture specification in oss format\textsuperscript{13}. The process involves the parsing of the .oss file and the creation of the CHESS entities (including the SysML diagrams) of the model. Figure 27 left-side and right-side show respectively the file.oss and the “Model Explorer View” populated with the imported entities.

![Figure 27. Example of file.oss and the “Model Explorer View” populated with the imported entities.](image)

This feature allows the Prototype P2 to obtain the system architecture from external system design and development tools. A candidate tool is AutoFOCUS\textsuperscript{3}\textsuperscript{14} because it supports the import/export of oss files.

2.2.2.3 Compare different architectures (*)

This operation involves the following sequential activities:

1. Model the parameterized architecture
2. Instantiate the architecture
3. Perform the analyses over the architecture instances

\textsuperscript{12} https://projects.eclipse.org/projects/modeling.capra


\textsuperscript{14} https://af3.fortiss.org/
4. Compare the architecture instances according to the analysis results

A parameterized architecture is an architecture in which the number of components, the number of ports, the connections, and the static attributes of components depends on a (possibly infinite) set of parameters. In CHESS, such parameters are mapped to static UML ports. In this way, it is not required to define an additional element in the CHESS profile. The parameters can be constrained using the UML Constraint element. The elements that compose the architecture, such as the ports and the subcomponents, can be parameterized through the editing of their multiplicity attributes using the defined parameters, see Figure 28.

![Figure 28. BDD describing a parameterized architecture](image)

The System component has the parameter ‘number_subComp’ that is used to define the number of subcomponents of type BSCU. This parameter is constrained by the expression ‘number_subComp < 30’.

The modelling of the parameterized architecture is followed by its instantiation. In this phase the user sets the values of the parameters, i.e. he/she defines the configuration of the architecture.

OCRA takes in input the parameterized architecture and one or more configurations. Then, OCRA produces the instances of the architecture, and for each of them, it performs a list of contract-based verifications. The output are the results derived from the contract-based verifications (that are described in Section 2.2.4). The comparison of the results is described in the D4.6 deliverable [25], Section Trade-off Analysis.
2.2.3 V&V-based Assurance Impact Assessment

2.2.3.1 Metrics

Following describes the metrics for models and checklist type implemented in the Requirement Quality Analyzer tool RQA [22] presented in the section 2.4.4.3 Metrics for models and 2.4.4.4 Metric checklists of the D3.3 deliverable [16].

2.2.3.1.1 Correctness metrics for models (*)

The RQA tool implements the follow correctness metrics to assess models (Figure 29).

Class model

- Method hiding factor
  This metric is a measure of the encapsulation in the class. It is the ratio of the sum of hidden methods (private and protected) to the total number of methods defined in each class (public, private, and protected).

- Attribute Hiding Factor
  This metric represents the average of the invisibility of attributes in the class diagram. It is the ratio of the sum of hidden attributes (private and protected) for all the classes to the sum of all defined attributes (public, private, and protected).

- Public methods
  This metric calculates the public methods in a class.

- Number of methods
  This metric Count all methods (public, protected, and private) in a class.

- Design Size in Classes
  This metric is a count of the total number of classes in the design.

Package model

- Abstractness
  The abstractness metric measures the package abstraction rate. A package abstraction level depends on its stability level. Calculations are performed on classes defined directly in the package and those defined in sub-packages. In UML models, this metric is calculated on all the model classes.

Sequence Diagram

- Message With Label Ratio
  Measures the ratio of messages with label (any text attached to the messages) to the total number of messages in a sequence diagram.

- Return Message With Label Ratio
  Measures the ratio of return messages with label (any text attached to the return messages) to the total number of return messages in a sequence diagram.
2.2.3.1.2 Checklist metrics (*)

The RQA tool has included a new kind of metric based on Checklist. A checklist is a test with a series of questions that the user must answer (Figure 30).

![Figure 29. Correctness metrics for models](image)

![Figure 30. Window to answer the questions of the checklist metrics](image)
Depending on the answers, it is possible to weight the result to provide a quality measure using quality ranges defined (Figure 31).

![Quality Measure Diagram]

**Figure 31.** Results presentation of the checklist metrics

There are two types of checklist metric:

- Correctness checklist metric: the question included in this metric must be answered by each workproduct of the specification (Figure 32).
Figure 32. Correctness checklist metric configuration

- Completeness checklist metric: the questions included in this metric must be answered at the specification level (Figure 33).
2.2.3.2 Connectors (*)

A connector between RQA and the AMASS platform has been implemented. This activity will be reported in the deliverable D5.6 Prototype for seamless interoperability [26].
### 2.2.3.3 V&V Manager

#### Table 8. Requirements covered by the V&V Manager

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_003</td>
<td>Validate requirements checking consistency, redundancy, ... on formal properties</td>
<td>The system shall be able to validate formal requirements/properties</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, OCRA, V&amp;V Manager</td>
<td>FBK, HON, UOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_005</td>
<td>Verify (model checking) state machines</td>
<td>The system shall be able to verify the component behavioural model match with the specification</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, NuXmv, V&amp;VManager</td>
<td>FBK, HON, UOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_007</td>
<td>Generation of reports about system description/verification results ....</td>
<td>The system shall generate reports about system/subsystem/component verification results</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>CHESS, V&amp;VManager</td>
<td>FBK, HON</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V&V Manager is an Eclipse plugin under development that enables invocation of multiple verification and validation tools, which process requirements or contracts directly from the AMASS platform. The V&V Manager for given requirements (and optionally also system architecture or design) connects to the verification server using OSLC Automation integration to get the V&V Assurance results. These results report whether the requirements are consistent, non-redundant, non-vacuous, and realizable; if system architecture or design information is available it also reports whether the given model complies with the requirements.

#### 2.2.3.3.1 Implementation progress (*)

The V&V Manager plugin implementation was updated with new functionality (more human-readable language of contracts, merging of contracts of nested components possible). The verification status is now updated in the V&V Results view quasi-continually.
Figure 34. GUI element used to run the V&V Manager

The view for presenting the result of the verification can be shown. This view can display textual documents.

Figure 35. Switch in on the V&V Result view
The contracts are expected to be written in the LTL (Linear Temporal Logic) Language extended with arithmetic expressions and subset of MTL language (Metric Temporal Logic) syntax, allowing direct expression of real-time requirements with math equations. An example of the guarantee part of a contract is depicted in the Figure 36. The guarantee editor is tailored to the OCRA syntax and provides helpful hints about the inconsistencies in the text, e.g. underlining the names of variables having no counterpart in the list of ports. The remaining underline in the figure below is there because the syntax linked to the editor does not allow string literals, which are nevertheless allowed.

![Figure 36. Example of constraint's guarantee.](image)

The presence of signal names as clearly isolated lexical elements enables their comparison to the relevant port names. Signal names that are used in the contract properties but not found among the port names are reported.

The formal properties are automatically translated to LTL before they are sent to the Verification Server. In the current stage of the plugin development it is beneficial to have the opportunity to visually inspect the inputs to the Verification Server. Therefore, the LTL representation of the contracts and the lists of input and output signals are displayed together with the V&V results, as can be seen in the Figure 37.
The findings of the V&V tools are also displayed in the V&V Results view, as shown in the Figure 37. Some tools may provide their answer almost immediately (which can be the case e.g. for checking of consistency or redundancy), while other tools take more time to terminate their tasks (e.g. realizability checking). Therefore, the V&V Manager monitors the consolidated response provided by the Verification Server and updates the V&V Results view in short periods of time in order to present the most recent status of validation and verification.

2.2.3.2 Verification Servers and Implementation Progress (*)

The communication between the V&V Manager (the Eclipse plugin) and the Verification Server is based on OSLC, i.e. there is a specification describing interaction between these two parts, which conforms to OSLC Performance Monitoring and OSLC Automation specifications. The V&V Manager is an OSLC consumer and the Verification Server is an OSLC provider.

Currently, there is one public Verification Server (hosted at Masaryk University). Verification servers at Honeywell are not public since they also host licensed V&V tools and are used for Honeywell confidential data. The V&V tools that are planned to be used for performing the semantic requirement analysis tasks have been already installed. What remains to be done is to finish implementation of the V&V Manager (increase its flexibility, make use of the traceability available in the AMASS Platform); the communication with the Verification Server is both fully specified and tested.

It is relatively easy to add another new OSLC provider similar to the existing Verification Server. The interaction between the V&V Manager and the new verification server will have to be completely tested. Therefore, each user can set up whatever selection of verification tools is required. Note that although OSLC resources are defined in terms of RDF properties and operations on resources are performed using HTTP, i.e. OSLC provider is usually located on a remote server, it is also possible to use local verification servers running on localhost.
2.2.3.3 Semantic Requirement Analysis (*

This V&V technique formally proves if a given set of formal requirements or contracts is consistent, non-redundant, non-vacuous, realizable and complete. Our approach is to execute multiple V&V tools and their configurations at once on multiple Verification Servers in parallel since often even V&V tool experts proficient in formal methods cannot determine which V&V tool and configuration will yield the best and/or quickest result. Moreover, especially for model checking this approach distributes the computationally expensive V&V tasks to multiple servers and is the fastest way to get the V&V results.

The screenshots below show the example verification results from the Honeywell proprietary tool ForReq. The same results will be visible from the AMASS platform after the V&V Manager implementation is finished. Figure 38 shows requirements that could be realised by some trivial system, which suggests that the requirements are incomplete. Figure 39 shows requirements that are non-realizable; more specifically the first two requirements are realizable and when the third requirement is added to them, it makes them unrealizable.

The analysis internally calls Acacia+ (which is a tool internally also called by the RQA tool mentioned above) to obtain the realizability witness: a strategy that prescribes what reactions to input signals will lead to requirements satisfaction. In addition to demonstrating that the requirements are realizable, ForReq also interprets this witness to estimate the complexity of the requirements, and thus to some extent their completeness. For each input and output signal we compute the coverage by user requirements. The best requirements can only be satisfied if the system may need to react to a change in the value of each particular input. On the other hand, if a system can completely ignore some (or all) input signals, then we proclaim the requirements to be trivially satisfied. In a similar manner, ForReq assigns a degree of coverage to every signal, ranging from “fully covered” to “not covered” and reports this complexity analysis to the user in a comprehensive manner.

Since performing realizability checking is often very time-consuming task, the requirements are also checked for logical consistency which is a weaker property than realizability, yet easier to compute. The consistency checking is performed by the tool ReMUS which was developed by Masaryk University. If the requirements are found to be inconsistent, ReMUS also identifies the minimal inconsistent subsets of the whole set of requirements, i.e. the sources of the inconsistencies. This information can be then used by the user to refine the requirements.

![Figure 38. Example of requirements from Gesture Recognition system (Case Study 7) that are only trivially realisable](image-url)
2.2.3.3.4 Formal Verification of Requirements against System Design

When system architecture or system design is available, each requirement should be verified for compliance with the system. This needs requirements to be formal and mapped to the system. The Figure below shows an example of a few requirements and the results from 3 model checkers from 3 different verification servers. It should always be the case that the V&V tools agree with the result. However, often only some of the model checkers or their configurations are able to return the complete result.

When the requirement is not satisfied by the given system, the counterexample is provided in the form of table showing relevant input and output values in time that falsify given requirement and also, in the case of a Simulink system design, a counterexample model that shows the falsifying behaviour.

Figure 39. Example of requirements that are consistent, non-redundant and not realisable

Figure 40. Details for requirements checking
For system design in C or C++, only the DIVINE LLVM model checker is currently integrated. Simple requirements could be translated to the form of C asserts and verified by the DIVINE model checker jointly with other safety properties or C asserts that are not derived from requirements. This is demonstrated in the figure below.

![Image of DIVINE model checker](image)

**Figure 41.** Checking and proposed error handling

### Model Checking (*)

**Table 9.** Covered requirements regarding the verification of state machines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_005</td>
<td>Verify (model checking)</td>
<td>state machines</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, NuXmv, V&amp;VManag er</td>
<td>FBK, HON, UOM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To check if the behaviour of the entire system or the behaviour of single components is compliant with a set of formal properties, CHESS interacts with nuXmv\(^{15}\). nuXmv is a symbolic model checker for the analysis of synchronous finite-state and infinite-state systems.

To perform the model checking command, the state machines that are used to describe the system behaviour, are translated in the SMV language\(^ {16}\) and stored as a file with the .smv extension. nuXmv takes

---

15 [https://nuxmv.fbk.eu](https://nuxmv.fbk.eu)

16 The language used by xSAP to represent the nominal model, see [http://nusmv.fbk.eu/NuSMV/papers/sttt_j/html/node7.html](http://nusmv.fbk.eu/NuSMV/papers/sttt_j/html/node7.html)
in input the file, the list of formal properties and returns the result of the check. If the properties are not satisfied, a counterexample is shown in the dedicated “Behaviour Trace View” of CHESS (see Figure 42.).

![Counterexample shown in the “Behaviour Trace View”](image)

**Figure 42.** Counterexample shown in the “Behaviour Trace View”

### 2.2.3.5 Generate fault trees from the behavioural model and the fault injection

**Table 10. Covered requirements regarding generation of fault trees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP3_SC_006</td>
<td>Specify component behavioural model (state machines)</td>
<td>The system shall be able to specify the component behavioural model</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>FBK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_010</td>
<td>Model-based safety analysis</td>
<td>The system shall allow the user to generate fault trees and FMEA tables from the behavioural model and the fault injection</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>CHESS, XSAP</td>
<td>INT, FBK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Generation of fault tree from the behavioural and fault model is supported by xSAP, a tool for safety assessment of synchronous finite-state and infinite-state systems. CHESS implements a seamless integration with xSAP to allow the automatic generation of fault trees starting from the information made available in the CHESS model. In particular, the following information available in CHESS is used for the transformation to xSAP:

- System components (hierarchical architecture): SysML Blocks or UML Components with port definitions and composite relationships
- For each component:
  - The nominal behaviour, modelled using state machines; the activities in the state machine have to be specified using the NUSMV language.
  - The error behaviour, modelled by using a state machine stereotyped with the `<<ErrorModel>>` (see Figure 43) stereotype available from the CHESS dependability profile. The CHESS dependability profile is also used to model error states, error propagation (e.g. InternalPropagation in Figure 43) and failure conditions (e.g. stuckAt value, inverted error) in component properties.

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17 [https://xsap.fbk.eu/](https://xsap.fbk.eu/)

18 The language used by xSAP to represent the nominal model, see [http://nusmv.fbk.eu/NuSMV/papers/sttt_j/html/node7.html](http://nusmv.fbk.eu/NuSMV/papers/sttt_j/html/node7.html)

19 CHESS comes with a dedicated profile for dependability for modelling safety aspects related to the system architecture. The metamodel from which the CHESS dependability profile has been derived is the SafeConcert metamodel; this metamodel is presented in AMASS D3.3 [16] Appendix C.
Figure 43. CHESS error model state machine

An initial integration between CHESS and xSAP was originally developed in SafeCer. In AMASS this integration has been reviewed; the model-to-text transformation has been extended and fixed according to the latest modifications of the CHESS profile, in particular of the CHESS Contract sub-profile. Moreover, some bugs have been discovered and fixed.

In the second prototype, CHESS provides a Fault Tree View to graphically represent the result of the analysis as a table or tree, see respectively Figure 44 and Figure 45.

Figure 44. Example of fault tree represented as a table
2.2.3.6 Simulation-based Fault Injection (*)

Table 11. Requirements covering simulation-based fault injection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP3_5C_007</td>
<td>Fault injection (include faulty behaviour of a component)</td>
<td>The system shall have fault injection capabilities</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, SABOTAGE</td>
<td>INT, TEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_011</td>
<td>Simulation-based Fault Injection</td>
<td>The system should allow the user to generate fault injection simulations from the fault trees and FMEA tables</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>SABOTAGE</td>
<td>TEC, AIT, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model-based design combined with a simulation-based fault injection technique is a promising solution for the early safety assessment of systems. The fault injection functionality is supported by the Sabotage tool, which is based on a simulation fault injection framework. The Sabotage tool helps to specify different failures within a model-based system design performed in Matlab/Simulink. The Eclipse modelling framework (EMF) in combination with Massif [15], which converts from MATLAB Simulink models to EMF, supports the specification of failures with an intuitive fault list. Sabotage automatically adds “saboteur” blocks into Simulink models to reproduce those specific failures. The saboteur block is a Simulink s-function block, whose custom C code implements the injected fault. The tests are run and the results are analysed and visualised.
One of the main goals that AMASS promotes is the use and creation of model-based solutions. In that direction, the configuration, creation, run and visualisation of the fault injection experiments is developed into an Eclipse framework. In addition, this framework provides the communication with Matlab/Simulink tool.

Due to the use of Eclipse framework in the Sabotage tool, the user does not need to be familiar with the low-level configuration technologies for the automatic generation of fault injection experiments, for example, EMF, Xtend, Matlab/Simulink, Java and C code. Figure 46 depicts the technologies involved in integrating our Eclipse framework with Sabotage.

![Figure 46. Sabotage design architecture.](image)

Even though this functionality is released as part of Prototype P2, it extends work started in Prototype P1. Thus, some preliminary results and concepts are already covered in the D3.5 deliverable [21]. However, those results and concepts are improved for this third Prototype (P2).

After investigating how to model the configuration of fault injection experiments, EMF technology has been chosen. The reason why, is the possibility to link Sabotage configuration to the Massif meta-model. The meta-model, which configures the experiments of the fault injection, is called Sabotage. The Sabotage meta-model is used to configure the failures that will be reproduced in the system. To establish where those failures will be injected, the Massif meta-model is used. The Massif meta-model, which is created based on EMF technology, provides the architecture of the system in a manner compatible with the Sabotage meta-model.

On the other hand, Model-to-text transformations are adopted for automation of the experiments. More specifically, the template language Xtend [14] is applied to generate Matlab and C code. Xtend technology includes a template language to generate code. As explained in D3.3, the Sabotage framework creates the golden (fault-free) and the faulty System Model Under Test (SMUT). The Xtend technology is employed to export the resulting C code that generates each failure, Matlab code to create a golden and a faulty SMUT, and Matlab code to execute the experiments and visualise the results. Xtend allows the creation of code replacing the dynamic areas of the template with information from a metamodel. In this case, that information comes from the Sabotage and Massif meta-models. The following lines explain some of the functionalities in a more accurate way.
- Configuration of the fault injection experiments:

One of the major issues regarding the configuration of the fault injection experiments and the creation of the fault list [16] is to define where to inject the faults. Those faults reproduce failure behaviours on certain components.

In Figure 47 a fault list is defined in the Sabotage model where all the faults, readouts and their properties are specified.

![Figure 47. Sabotage Fault List](image)

To extract the necessary information regarding possible injection points, Massif is used. The necessary information regarding possible injection points (i.e. Connection) is extracted, importing the Simulink model to Massif. This includes information regarding the architecture of the system and the connection between input and output ports. The same concept applies to the observation points, monitors or read-outs. This information needs to be specified based on the current system model.

An example architecture of a DC drive system defined in Massif model is shown in Figure 48.
Generation of the fault injection experiments:

One of the main remarkable features is the construction of the golden and the faulty Simulink models. After generation of the fault list, the Xtend technology creates Matlab code files (Figure 50), which construct the golden and faulty Simulink models. These Matlab code files create a golden Simulink model (fault-free system with readouts inside) and a faulty Simulink model (Figure 49) with the faults of the fault list and the readouts. The Matlab code files handle the generation of the C code files where the behaviour of faults are reproduced.

Figure 48. Massif model of the DC drive system

Figure 49. Example of the generated saboteur
The Fault Injector creates and completes the C code (see Figure 51) of each saboteur for the corresponding S-functions block in Simulink. In the case where the fault is easily represented as a Simulink default blocks, e.g. random or delay failures, that block is used instead of an S-function blocks. This decision is related to fault representativeness, where it is tested that those blocks sufficiently represent the behaviour of those specific fault models.

Figure 51. Example of a saboteur code

Figure 50. Xtend templates for the generation of saboteurs and readouts

Figure 52 illustrates how the integration of the Sabotage framework is carried out with respect to contracts. This allows to read the CHESS/Savona Model and relate information such as the aforementioned failure mode of a certain component defined as part of the system architecture.
During this the development of the last prototype iteration this work has been enhanced in order to investigate and add the following features as follows. The possible role and integration of other architecture-driven assurance functionalities with Sabotage have been studied during the project, especially establishing relations to contracts-based approach and model-based safety analysis. This means that the information regarding the fault type to be introduced can be linked as information contained in the system architecture (failure mode). In order to complete the information describing the faulty behaviour of a certain component and reproduce that behaviour in a form of a saboteur. As specified in Section 2.2.1.1, the failure modelling feature is currently supported via the CHESS profile but not as part of the AMASS building block.

![Figure 52. Integration with safety contracts](image)

### 2.2.3.7 Support for traceability between different kinds of V&V evidence

**Table 12. Requirements covering traceability of different V&V artefacts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_001</td>
<td>Traceability between different kinds of V&amp;V evidence</td>
<td>The system shall provide the ability to trace immediate evidence (obtained during the execution of the left-hand side of the V-model) with direct evidence (obtained during the execution of the right-hand side of the V-model). For instance: a contract-based, component-based specification should be traced with the corresponding analysis-results.</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CAPRA</td>
<td>INT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_002</td>
<td>Trace model-to-model transformation</td>
<td>The system shall be able to trace all component model transformations executed during V&amp;V model-based analysis</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>CAPRA</td>
<td>INT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One of the AMASS requirements about architecture-driven assurance is about traceability of different artefacts produced during the model-based design and implementation process. For instance, the requirement cites “a contract-based, component-based specification should be traced with the corresponding analysis-results”.

Support for this requirement has been implemented in CHESS modelling language, in order to be able to trace analysis results to the set of model entities and assumptions used to perform that particular analysis. The adopted approach has been inherited by the MARTE modelling language, which comes with the concept of analysis context allowing to represent the set of model information needed to run a given analysis.

The CHESS modelling language has been extended with AMASS-specific analysis contexts; for instance, the new stereotype named ContractRefinementAnalysisContext (see Figure 53) identifies the information available in the CHESS model for a given contract refinement analysis. The aforementioned information is the set of components with associated contracts that has to be analysed; the CHESS model can comprise different views (e.g. functional, logical, physical) and different analyses can be run on each of the different views, or even different parts of the same view.

The ContractRefinementAnalysisContext stereotype also comes with a Boolean attribute checkAllWeakContracts which can be used; if the value is true all weak contracts available in the current components set identified by the analysis context are considered, otherwise only the weak contracts marked by the modeller as valid are given in input to the analysis.

According to the new modelling language support, the CHESS tool has been modified to allow the user to invoke contract refinement analysis, the latter performed thanks to the integration with the OCRA tool (see section 2.2.3.3), by selecting an existing ContractRefinementAnalysisContext. Once the analysis has finished, analysis results can then be linked to the analysis context, and hence to the target analysed set of components and associated contracts; this last step is not currently automated and must be made by the user using the traceability capabilities discussed in section 2.2.2.1.
2.2.3.8 Generation of product-based assurance arguments from CHESS model

The generation of product-based assurance arguments is based on the assurance information associated with the strong and weak contracts. To include only the relevant weak contracts in generation we need to first know which of those hold in the current system. To achieve that, we have extended the CHESS tool by using the `checkAllWeakContracts` attribute when performing contract refinement analysis to transform all the weak contracts into OCRA format. All strong contracts $C=(A,G)$ are transformed into normal OCRA contracts $C=(A,G)$, while the weak contracts $C_w=(B,H)$ are transformed into guaranteed implications in OCRA as $C_w=(\text{TRUE},B\Rightarrow H)$. The refinement connection of $C_w$ is inherited from the corresponding weak contracts.

To check consistency of the weak assumptions in the given context and identify which weak contracts should be used in argument generation, we have extended the CHESS tool to allow for property validation of the weak contract assumptions in OCRA. The results of both OCRA commands are saved in a file and previewed to the user. The results are used to update the status of the contracts. To perform the contract refinement analysis with all weak contracts, the user sets the Boolean attribute `checkAllWeakContracts` of the `ContractRefinementAnalysisContext` stereotype to TRUE and selects the Check Contract Refinement functionality. Then, to validate the weak contract assumptions, the user makes sure the `checkAllWeakContract` attribute is set to TRUE and selects the Validate Weak Contracts functionality.

Based on the contract status we create a set of argument fragments in the corresponding assurance case project where they can be viewed in the assurance case editor. The generator uses a pre-existing argument pattern for the generation using information from the traceability editor of the contracts and the assurance evidence. The generated argument fragments include only assurance evidence for those contracts relevant in the given context, which is determined by the status attribute of the contracts. The argument fragment generation can only be performed after successful refinement analysis and contract validity checks. The generation is performed from the `ContractRefinementAnalysisContext` argument generator property tab.

2.2.3.9 Reports Generation (*)

**Table 13. Requirements covering the generation of system reports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_007</td>
<td>Generation of reports about system description/verification results</td>
<td>The system shall generate reports about system/subsystem/component verification results</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>CHESS, V&amp;VManager</td>
<td>FBK, HON</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third prototype (Prototype P2) enables the generation of reports stored in files. In particular, the tool can generate a document, either as doc or tex format, containing tables and diagrams as shown in Figure 54.
Figure 54. Excerpt of 2 pages of the generated report.

2.2.4 Contract-based Assurance Composition

2.2.4.1 Contract Editor with content assist

Table 14. Requirements covering the improvement of contract creation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_009</td>
<td>Improvement of Contract definition process</td>
<td>The operation of contract definition should be improved in terms of time spent.</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, SAVONA</td>
<td>FBK, B&amp;M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the AMASS prototype, the contract definition and the property definition can be edited using an editor with content assist, see Figure 55. The latter provides two utilities: (1) it notifies whether a word does not belong to the language used or whether it is not a port or an attribute of the component of the editing contract/property. (2) It suggests the keyword of the language used and the ports and attributes of the component.
In this example, in the editing area of the assume property, an incorrect port name is highlighted. In the editing area of the guarantee property, it is suggested which are the compatible keywords or identifiers to insert.

### 2.2.4.2 Contract-based Views

#### Table 15. Requirements covering the overview of contracts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_011</td>
<td>Overview of contract-based validation for behavioural models</td>
<td>The system could enable users to have an overview of the validation of a contract over a state-machine. In case of failure, the system could enable users to have information about the trace that does not fulfill the contract.</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>FBK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the AMASS prototype, CHESS provides a hierarchical view that shows the decomposition of the system component into sub-components. It also shows the contracts assigned for each component. The system is represented graphically as the top element of the view (see Figure 56).
Figure 56. Hierarchical view of the system decomposed into sub-components and contracts

CHESS also provides a hierarchical view that shows the contracts with their refining contracts, see Figure 57. The weak contracts are graphically represented as a document with a "W" on top.

Figure 57. Contract Refinement View

2.2.4.3 Contract refinement analysis

Table 16. Requirements covering contract refinement analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_007</td>
<td>Overview of check refinements results</td>
<td>The system should enable users to have an overview in terms of status of check refinement of all the defined contracts.</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>FBK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_008</td>
<td>Contract-based validation and verification</td>
<td>The system must provide support for contract-based system validation and verification, including</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>FBK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contract refinement analysis is supported by the OCRA tool. CHESS comes with a seamless integration with OCRA which allows invocation of the analysis starting from the components and associated contracts available in the CHESS model. When the analysis is invoked through the CHESS tool the following steps are performed:

1. A validation is performed on the CHESS model to check that the modelled information is available and syntactically correct with respect to what is required by OCRA.
2. The user selects the analysis context that has to be taken into account.
3. Model-to-text transformation from CHESS model to OCRA language is executed (.oss artefact derivation, see Figure 58).
4. The OCRA tool is invoked with the produced .oss and with the appropriate command option.
5. The results from the OCRA analysis are showed to the modeller in a dedicated window and saved as output artefacts in a specific folder under the current CHESS project.

![Component Diagram](image)

**Figure 58.** Part of the OCRA input file, also called OSS (OCRA System Specification). It describes the system architecture represented by a tree of components (given by the decomposition into sub-components).
Figure 59. Selecting analysis context for contract refinement

The integration between CHESS and OCRA was originally developed in SafeCer. In AMASS, this integration has been improved, in particular by introducing the analysis context support; moreover, the model-to-text transformation has been reviewed according to the latest modifications of the CHESS profile, in particular those of the CHESS Contract sub-profile.

2.2.4.4 Contract-based Safety Analysis

The contract-based safety analysis detects the component failures as the failure of its implementation to satisfy the contract. When the component is composite, its failure can be caused by the failure of one or more subcomponents and/or the failure of the environment in satisfying the assumption. This dependency can be automatically computed based on the contract refinement. CHESS interacts with OCRA to produce a fault tree in which each intermediate event represents the failure of a component or its environment.

2.2.4.5 Contract-based verification of the behavioural model

Table 17. Requirements covering contract verification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_001</td>
<td>Validate composition of components by validating their contracts</td>
<td>The system shall be able to validate the composition of components by supporting the validation of their contracts, analyzing the relationship among assumptions and guarantees</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, OCRA</td>
<td>FBK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_008</td>
<td>Contract-based validation and verification</td>
<td>The system must provide support for contract-based system validation and verification, including refinement checking, compositional verification of behavioural models, contract-based fault-tree generation</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>FBK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_CAC_012</td>
<td>Browse Contract status</td>
<td>The user shall be able to browse the contracts associated within a</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS</td>
<td>INT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirement No</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Tools</td>
<td>Involved Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP3_VVA_003</td>
<td>Validate requirements checking consistency, redundancy, ... on formal properties</td>
<td>The system shall be able to validate formal requirements/properties</td>
<td>Solved</td>
<td>CHESS, OCRA, V&amp;V Manager</td>
<td>FBK, HON, UOM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Contract-based verification of the behavioural model is supported by the OCRA tool. This functionality verifies whether the finite state machines defined in the CHESS model verify the contracts. The state machines are translated into the SMV language, where the behaviour is described by means of logical formulas that describe the initial states and the state transitions; see Figure 60. Meanwhile, the contracts, as already mentioned in Section 2.2.3.3, are translated into the OCRA language in an .oss file. CHESS sends such information as input to OCRA, and then to the Trace View; for each contract the result of the check is shown, see Figure 61.

```
-- Source file of the SMV model
-- This model defines the behaviour of the system
-- The behaviour is described by means of logical formulas

MODULE AlternateCommandCalculator(power, as_cmd_in_1, as_cmd_in_2)
VAR
  as_cmd_out : real;
ASSIGN
  as_cmd_out := case
  (power & as_cmd_in_1 >= as_cmd_in_2) : as_cmd_in_1;
  (power & !(as_cmd_in_1 >= as_cmd_in_2)) : as_cmd_in_2;
TRUE : 0;
ESAC;
LTLSPEC NAME alternate_command_computation_norm_guarantee := (TRUE -> ((power & as_c

-- End of module

MODULE NormalCommandCalculator(power, brake_cmd, as_cmd)
VAR
  brake_as_cmd : real;
ASSIGN
  brake_as_cmd := case
  (power & as_Cmd = 1) : 0;
  (power & as_Cmd = 0) : brake_cmd;
TRUE : 0;
ESAC;
LTLSPEC NAME normal_command_computation_norm_guarantee := (TRUE -> ((power & as_cmd

-- End of module
```

*Figure 60.* Part of an `.SMV` file representing the behaviour of the leaf components of the model
Figure 61. In this example, for each contract the results of the Contract-based verification are listed in the Trace View.
3. Installation and User Manuals

The steps necessary to install the final prototype are going to be exhaustively described in the AMASS User Manual (currently in progress) and will not be repeated here. That document will contain all required steps and document references to set up the tools. There is currently no pre-packaged distribution.

Users can find the installation instructions, the tool environment description, and the functionalities for the creation of Standards and Process models (models representing Standards, Regulations, or Company-specific Processes), Assurance Projects and the associated Evidence models ( Artefacts), Compliance Maps (so far, compliance maps from Reference Artefacts to Artefacts), and Argumentation models, in addition to Architecture models.

A methodological guideline on how to use the presented tools will be published within D3.8 [23].
4. Implementation Description

4.1 Implemented Modules

4.1.1 System Component Specification Block

As documented in AMASS deliverable D2.4 [7], the System Component Specification logical building block decomposes into two sub-blocks (see Figure 62): the Component Editor and the Contract Editor. The purpose of the first tool module is to provide services for architecture specification; the second tool module provides services to store and instantiate contracts and to associate them to the architectural entities.

The two aforementioned blocks and associated services are made available in the AMASS platform through the usage of the Eclipse-Based Papyrus UML/SysML Editor extended with the CHESS plugins. In particular, Papyrus contains plugins for editing the architectural/component-based models, together with the possibility to model requirements (by using the SysML profile support). CHESS provides plugins for management of formal properties and contract specifications and their association with the architectural components.

The CHESS profile for Contract (see D3.1 [10]) is implemented as a UML/SysML profile; the profile has been designed using the Papyrus editor facilities.

![Figure 62. Tool modules for System Component Specification](image)

4.1.2 Architecture-Driven Assurance Block

As documented in AMASS deliverable D2.4 [7], the Architecture-Driven Assurance allows for explicit integration of assurance and certification activities with the CPS development activities, including specification and design. It decomposes into four sub-blocks: System architecture modelling for assurance, V&V-based Assurance Impact Assessment, Contract-Based Assurance Composition, and Assurance Patterns Library Management.
4.2 Source Code Description

4.2.1 System Component Specification Block

Papyrus\textsuperscript{20} is an Eclipse project and its source code is freely available through the Eclipse GIT server\textsuperscript{21}.

The source code of the CHESS contract editor is available through the Polarsys CHESS project\textsuperscript{22}.

Extensions to the Polarsys CHESS project are foreseen during the context of AMASS project; the extensions will be developed by working on an AMASS dedicated code repository (\url{https://services.medini.eu/svn/AMASS_source}). Then, once the extensions are sufficiently mature, they will be pushed to the Polarsys CHESS repository as AMASS contributions.

The additional CHESS plugins that need to be installed on top of Papyrus environment to enable the CHESS-based AMASS Contract Editor features are the following (see also Figure 63):

- \texttt{org.polarsys.chess.contracts.chessextension}: provides the Papyrus extension to easily work with the CHESS Contract profile, for instance to facilitate the creation of CHESS stereotypes.
- \texttt{org.polarsys.chess.contract.integration}: implements the integration with the OCRA and XSAP tools; in particular, it allows automatically invoking the aforementioned tools and getting back the obtained results within the Eclipse environment.
- \texttt{org.polarsys.chess.contracts.profile}: implements the CHESS profile for contracts.
- \texttt{org.polarsys.chess.contracts.transformations}: implements the model of text transformation for integration with the OCRA and XSAP tools; in particular a corresponding OCRA model can be generated starting from the components and contracts modelled in UML/SysML and CHESS profile. The plugin adds a dedicated command to the CHESS Eclipse menu to invoke the transformations.
- \texttt{org.polarsys.chess.contracts.validation}: implements the validation of the constraints that the CHESS model has to satisfy in order to allow the mapping to the OCRA language and then the integration with the OCRA tool.
- \texttt{org.polarsys.chess.contracts.feature}: allows to deploy/undeploy the CHESS plugins related to contract-based design support.
- \texttt{org.polarsys.chess.contracts.contractPropertyManager}: allows the automatic generation of the contract component when a contractInstance is associated with a component.

\textsuperscript{20} \url{https://eclipse.org/papyrus/}
\textsuperscript{21} \url{https://git.eclipse.org/c/papyrus/org.eclipse.papyrus.git/}
\textsuperscript{22} \url{https://git.polarsys.org/c/chess/chess.git?h=develop}
One important point to mention is that, in addition to the aforementioned support for contract design, the Polarsys CHESS project provides additional features.

In particular, the Polarsys CHESS project provides a set of core plugins that allow the application of the CHESS methodology ([1][2]). This is the base upon which the AMASS methodology has been built. The actual CHESS methodology allows the design, verification and implementation of cyber physical software systems; CHESS adopts a dedicated component model language [4] and ad-hoc model transformations to enable timing/dependability analysis and code generation. Moreover, the CHESS methodology defines a multi-view approach for modelling the different aspects/concerns of the system; for each view, the diagrams and entities that can be created/viewed/modified are fixed and formalized in the view definition. The CHESS plugins extend the Papyrus editor to support the CHESS modelling language and design-by-view approach; so, by using the CHESS Papyrus extension, the constraints imposed by the CHESS methodology are enforced in a live manner, at modelling time, to avoid late discovery of modelling activities which can violate the correctness-by-construction approach implemented by CHESS.

The CHESS-based AMASS Contract plugins use some utilities provided by other core CHESS plugins; in detail, the core CHESS plugins used are:

- org.polarsys.chess.core: provides some facilities regarding selections and diagram status.
- org.polarsys.chess.services: provides functionalities about the CHESS editor (as extension of the Papyrus one).
- org.polarsys.chess.validation: provides functionalities about model validation.
- org.polarsys.chessmlprofile: provides the SysML/UML/MARTE profile implementation of the CHESS modelling language [3]. Moreover, it provides dedicated diagram palettes extending the Papyrus ones to easily manage the creation of CHESS stereotypes in a given diagram. Therefore, CHESS core plugins are required in order to use the CHESS Contract feature.
- org.polarsys.chess.diagramsCreator: enables the creation of SysML/UML diagrams taking as input the CHESS entities located in the model.
- org.polarsys.chess.OSSImporter: provides functionalities to parse a OSS file and to populate a CHESS project with the entities that are imported.

In order to allow the AMASS platform’s stakeholders to use the CHESS-based AMASS Contract features on top of the Papyrus editor without having to use the CHESS methodology for SW development, an extension
has been made to the CHESS core plugins. In particular, the user can decide to disable the live-check of the constraints associated to the CHESS multi-view support; in this way, the modeller can use the full Papyrus and UML features, together with the CHESS extension for contract-based design.

Figure 64 below provides a snapshot of the CHESS methodology constraints that can be enabled/disabled through the Eclipse preferences page.

![Figure 64. CHESS methodology constraint](image)

### 4.2.2 Architecture-Driven Assurance Block

#### 4.2.2.1 Requirements Formalization with Temporal Logics – RQA approach

To create the custom-coded metric needed to detect linear temporal logic consistency issues in the requirements, it is necessary to add the following information to RQA:

- **Assembly**: the .DLL file generated after building the project. It is necessary to include the entire path of the .DLL file or add it into the RQA installation path.
- **Class**: the name of the class in the project. RQA should help you to choose this field using the provided assembly.
- **Method**: the name of the method containing the code of the metric. RQA should help you to choose this field using the provided class.

#### 4.2.2.2 Simulation-based Fault Injection

As specified in Section 2.2.3.6 the MASSIF Simulink Integration Framework for Eclipse is used for accessing Simulink model information. Importing uses the command line interface of Matlab rather than directly parsing mdl or slx files. This is the API recommended by MathWorks for accessing Simulink model information.
Following the procedure explained in [https://github.com/viatra/massif], the user installs MASSIF into the Eclipse Neon environment. The most important prerequisites are the following:

1. Clone the Massif "Master" branch from https://github.com/viatra/massif (Massif 0.6.0).
2. Install VIATRA Query and Transformation SDK 1.5.0 from http://download.eclipse.org/viatra/updates/release/. Note that there is a dependency between VIATRA and EMF. To avoid any incompatibilities with the VIATRA version, EMF 2.12 must be installed.
3. Install Xtext Complete SDK 2.10.

Note also the association between different meta-models. Especially between Sabotage and Massif meta-models.

- tecnalia.sabotage.ecore \(\rightarrow\) Sabotage meta-model defines all the faults injected in the Simulink model.
- hu.bme.mit.massif.simulink \(\rightarrow\) Massif meta-model is designed to store all information for each MATLAB block of a system.

![Figure 65. Massif and Sabotage meta-models](image)

It is necessary to load the Massif model system to the fault list to help the user to define where the faults are injected into that specific Massif model. To do that “load resource” functionality needs to be carried out at meta-model and model level in order to establish the connection. This means that not only the Sabotage meta-model and Massif meta-model are connected, but also when the user is using Sabotage model needs to link a Simulink model with a Sabotage model.

![Figure 66. Connection between Sabotage and Massif at meta-model level](image)
In order to perform code generation by means of Xtend (cf. Section), those meta-models are included as dependency plugins. Together with these plugins, other ones are required as well:

- **hu.meb.mit.massif.simulink**: provides the generated java files from Massif EMF meta-model. Massif meta-model is designed to store all information for each MATLAB block.
- **tecnalia.sabotage.faultlist**: provides the generated java files from Sabotage EMF meta-model. This meta-model defines all the faults injected in the Simulink model.
- **org.eclipse.core.runtime**: provides support for the runtime platform, core utility methods and the extension registry.
- **org.eclipse.xtext.generator**: provides Generator facilities for Xtext.
- **org.eclipse.emf.mwe2.launch**: MWE2 (Modeling Workflow Engine) allows composition of object graphs declaratively in a very compact manner.
- **org.eclipse.emf.mwe2.language.ui**: provides user interface for MWE2 facilities.
- **org.apache.log4j**: provides most of the logging operations, except configurations.
- **org.apache.commons.logging**: provides a logging interface that is intended to be both lightweight and an independent abstraction of other logging toolkits. It provides the middleware/tooling developer with a simple logging abstraction allowing the user (application developer) to plug in a specific logging implementation.

All of these are included in the manifest file.

![Project Explorer](image)

**Figure 67.** Code Generation workspace

### 4.2.2.3 Fault Trees generation (* *)

The plugins to visualise fault tree are the following:

- **eu.fbk.eclipse.standardtools.faultTreeViewer**
• eu.fbk.eclipse.standardtools.faultTreeViewer.emfta
• eu.fbk.eclipse.standardtools.faultTreeViewer.emfta.design

These are Eclipse plugins located in the EST git repository\textsuperscript{23}. The plugins are derived from the open source tool EMFTA\textsuperscript{24}, to embed the fault tree viewer inside the CHESS platform. The plugins require the Sirius Eclipse tool\textsuperscript{25} to work correctly.

4.2.2.4 Metrics

4.2.2.4.1 Metrics for requirements

4.2.2.4.1.1 Correctness metrics

Following, the functions of the source code are presented. For each metric two function are specified: one about the numerical value and the other giving feature information.

\textit{Metric to nouns}

\textbf{In-System Conceptual Model Nouns (SCM Nouns)}

ScmNounCount: return a double with the result of the metric.
ScmNounFeatures: return a list of strings with the resultant features of the metric.

\textbf{Out-of-System Conceptual Model Nouns (Out-of-SCM Nouns)}

OutOfScmNounCount: return a double with the result of the metric.
OutOfScmNounFeatures: return a list of strings with the resultant features of the metric.

\textbf{In-Semantic Clusters Nouns (SCC Nouns)}

SccNounCount: return a double with the result of the metric.
SccNounFeatures: return a list of strings with the resultant features of the metric.

\textbf{Out-of-Semantic Clusters Nouns (Out-of-SCC Nouns)}

OutOfSccNounCount: return a double with the result of the metric.
OutOfSccNounFeatures: return a list of string with the resultant features of the metric.

\textbf{In-Hierarchical Views Nouns (SCV Nouns)}

ScvNounCount: return a double with the result of the metric.
ScvNounFeatures: return a list of strings with the resultant features of the metric.

\textbf{Out-of-Hierarchical Views Nouns (Out-of-SCV Nouns)}

OutOfScvNounCount: return a double with the result of the metric.
OutOfScvNounFeatures: return a list of strings with the resultant features of the metric.

\textsuperscript{23} \url{https://gitlab.fbk.eu/CPS_Design/EST.git}
\textsuperscript{24} \url{https://github.com/juli1/emfta}
\textsuperscript{25} \url{https://eclipse.org/sirius/}
**Metric to verbs**

**In-System Conceptual Model Verbs (SCM Verbs)**
- ScmVerbCount: return a double with the result of the metric.
- ScmVerbFeatures: return a list of string with the resultant features of the metric.

**Out-of-System Conceptual Model Verbs (Out-of-SCM Verbs)**
- OutOfScmVerbCount: return a double with the result of the metric.
- OutOfScmVerbFeatures: return a list of strings with the resultant features of the metric.

**In-Semantic Clusters Verbs (SCC Verbs)**
- SccVerbCount: return a double with the result of the metric.
- SccVerbFeatures: return a list of string with the resultant features of the metric.

**Out-of-Semantic Clusters Verbs (Out-of-SCC Verbs)**
- OutOfSccVerbCount: return a double with the result of the metric.
- OutOfSccVerbFeatures: return a list of strings with the resultant features of the metric.

**In-Hierarchical Views Verbs (SCV Verbs)**
- ScvVerbCount: return a double with the result of the metric.
- ScvVerbFeatures: return a list of strings with the resultant features of the metric.

**Out-of-Hierarchical Views Verbs (Out-of-SCV Verbs)**
- OutOfScvVerbCount: return a double with the result of the metric.
- OutOfScvVerbFeatures: return a list of strings with the resultant features of the metric.

**4.2.2.4.2 Applying machine learning to improve the quality of requirements**

This functionality is implemented in an external tool and uses libraries from RQA.

**4.2.2.4.3 Metrics for models**

The structure of the source code previously implemented to generate the completeness and consistency metric relative to requirements has been adapted to evaluate the quality of the models. The information extracted from the models is processed by the metrics to evaluate the quality. The following list gives the function of each metric.

**Completeness**
- Terminology coverage:
  - TerminologyCoverageMetric_Evaluation
- Relationships from SCM View Coverage
  - SCMViewCoverageMetric_Evaluation
- Relationship types coverage
  - RelationshipTypeCoverageMetric_Evaluation
- Model-content coverage
ModelContentCoverageMetric_Evaluation

- Properties coverage
  PropertiesCoverageMetric_Evaluation

Consistency

- Property values
  PropertiesConsistencyMetric_Evaluation
- Arithmetic operation compliance with SCM
  ArithmeticOperationConsistencyMetric_Evaluation
- Overlapping requirements
  OverlappingConsistencyMetric_Evaluation
- Measurement units for specific property
  MeasurementUnitsSpecificPropertyConsistencyMetric_Evaluation

4.2.2.4 Quality evolution (with respect to time)

The quality evolution is represented with three general functions: save snapshot, show graphical quality evolution, and open snapshot information.

CreateAndSaveSnapshot: this function creates one snapshot with the quality information of the project.

LoadQualityEvolutionView: this function loads the quality value from the snapshot saved in the project and a graphical area chart is shown.

LoadQualityEvolutionSnapshot: this function shows the information contained in one snapshot.

4.2.2.5 Contract-Based Assurance Composition and Model Checking (*)

The plugins that need to be installed on top of the CHESS environment to enable the editor with content assist are the following:

- org.polarsys.chess.contracts.contractEditor: it provides a contract editor with content assist. It also enables the possibility to create a new contract directly from the editor view.
- org.polarsys.chess.constraints.constraintEditor: it provides a constraint editor with content assist.
- org.polarsys.chess.properties.propertyEditor: it provides a property editor with content assist.

The CHESS plugins to enable different hierarchical views based on contracts are the following:

- org.polarsys.chess.contracts.hierarchicalContractView: it provides a view that shows the decomposition of the system component into sub-components. It also shows the contracts assigned for each component.
- org.polarsys.chess.contracts.refinementView: it provides a view that shows the contracts with their refining contracts.

The complete set of contract-based analysis is provided by the following plugins:

- org.polarsys.chess.verificationService: it provides different analysis commands invoking the OCRA and nuXmv. They include “check contract refinement”, “contract-based safety analysis”, “check contract implementation” and “model checking”. 

• org.polarsys.chess.smvExporter: it translates the UML state machine in a coherent SMV file that is used as input for the V&V tools.

These depend on a set of Eclipse plugins located in the EST git repository\(^{26}\). The plugins are:

- eu.fbk.eclipse.standardtools.contractEditor.core: it contains the core functionalities used in the CHESS plugin contractEditor.
- eu.fbk.eclipse.standardtools.constraintEditor.core: it contains the core functionalities used in the CHESS plugin constraintEditor.
- eu.fbk.eclipse.standardtools.propertyEditor.core: it contains the core functionalities used in the CHESS plugin propertyEditor.
- eu.fbk.eclipse.standardtools.hierarchicalContractView.core: it contains the core functionalities used in the CHESS plugin hierarchicalContractView.
- eu.fbk.eclipse.standardtools.refinementView.core: it contains the core functionalities used in the CHESS plugin refinementView.
- eu.fbk.eclipse.standardtools.xtextService: it contains the core functionalities used in the three CHESS plugins editors.
- eu.fbk.eclipse.standardtools.ExecOcraCommands: it contains the core functionalities to interact with OCRA, that are used in the CHESS plugin verificationService.
- eu.fbk.eclipse.standardtools.nuXmvService: it contains the core functionalities to interact with nuXmv, that are used in the CHESS plugin verificationService.
- eu.fbk.eclipse.standardtools.ModelTranslatorToOcra: it contains the core functionalities to translate the CHESS model in a coherent OSS model.
- eu.fbk.eclipse.standardtools.StateMachineTranslatorToSmv: it contains the core functionalities to translate the state machines defined in the CHESS model in coherent SMV models.

There are some Eclipse plugins used by these Eclipse plugins as external libraries but not implemented in the project. They can be installed from the following Eclipse update site [http://es-static.fbk.eu/tools/amass_sde](http://es-static.fbk.eu/tools/amass_sde). The available plugins are:

- eu.fbk.tools.editor.*: plugins provided by FBK that enrich a text area with content assist for an LTL grammar.
- org.eclipse.xtext.*: xText library needed for the editor plugins.

Figure 68 shows in more detail the dependencies among the plugins. The set org.polarsys.chess.* are the plugins described in Section 4.2.1.

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\(^{26}\) [https://gitlab.fbk.eu/CPS_Design/EST.git](https://gitlab.fbk.eu/CPS_Design/EST.git)
Figure 68. Diagram showing the dependencies among the plugins. The direction of the arrow means that the origin plugin depends on the target plugin.

4.2.2.6 Report Generation (*)

The plugin developed to generate the report describing the system architecture is:

- org.polarsys.chess.diagram.ui: it enables the generation of a document in doc or tex format containing information about system components. Moreover, it provides functionalities to export UML/SysML diagrams as images. Those functionalities are used to generate the report.

4.2.2.7 Architectural Patterns (*)

The implementation related to architectural pattern definition and instantiation support is currently ongoing in AMASS.

A set of Papyrus plugins concerning architectural patterns support has been released by CEA in the context of the Papyrus Software Designer release27. The plugins can be reached on the following gerrit patch commit: [https://git.eclipse.org/r/#/c/126526/](https://git.eclipse.org/r/#/c/126526/). To be able to run them, additional plugins from Papyrus designer are required to satisfy dependencies as shown on Figure 69.

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27 [https://wiki.eclipse.org/Papyrus_Software_Designer](https://wiki.eclipse.org/Papyrus_Software_Designer)
The release enriches the Papyrus editor with a specific UML profile for pattern definition and provides support for pattern instantiation. It also contains associated Papyrus customization, as well as a subset of GoF patterns. There is support to apply / integrate a design pattern in application models. There is a small extension profile for safety patterns concerning a set of non-functional properties related to availability, reliability and resource consumption. Related to pattern instantiation, the tool provides support for managing the binding between the pattern roles, i.e. the abstract entities foreseen by the pattern definition, and the actual entities available in the given system model where the pattern is instantiated. The plugins include a minimal documentation as user manual.

The provided set of plugins is used as a baseline in AMASS; the original release targets the Eclipse Oxygen/Photon environment. A first experimentation has shown the usability of the plugins in Neon environment with degraded customization capabilities: basically, dedicated palette and stylesheets attached to the diagrams cannot be used. Although the customization features are not required for pattern definition and instantiation, the plugins have to be adapted to the Eclipse Neon AMASS environment to support full capability offers by the released plugins. Moreover, the integration with CHESS has to be realized, in particular to allow the modelling of contracts for patterns, enabling the application of the argumentation fragment for architectural patterns described in AMASS D3.3 [16].
5. Conclusions(*)

This deliverable D3.6 “Prototype for Architecture-Driven Assurance (c)” is the third and last output of the AMASS task T3.3 Implementation for Architecture-driven Assurance, whose objective is the development of a tooling framework to support architecture-driven assurance. Innovative approaches have been described within this document and were incorporated into the AMASS Tool Platform to reach this objective. CHESS and SAVONA allow the creation of system models based on the Papyrus Framework. Furthermore, system requirements and contracts can be defined, validated and verified using OCRA and the V&V Manager. Different metrics can be used via the RQA tool to analyse the modelled system and increase its quality. To support early safety assessments during development, the SABOTAGE tool offers simulation-based fault injection on the created system model. All of the assurance and model artefacts can thereby be traced using CAPRA.

With three planned prototype iterations for the framework, this deliverable reports the status for the third and final prototype release (Prototype P2), in particular for the system component specification and the tooling framework supporting architecture-driven assurance, by describing the supported functionalities and the details about implementation.

Following the two previous versions of this deliverable, D3.6 strongly focused on the integration of different approaches and ideas into one unified AMASS tooling framework supporting architecture-driven assurance. Among others, the AMASS Platform tools for the final Prototype P2, the finalized User Manuals and installation Instructions and the source code description for Prototype P2 were presented in detail in the document.

Based on the data provided for the deliverable, all partners showed significant effort with the implementation of their individual features and functionalities, which can also be seen by looking at the requirements table in section 2.2. Most of the requirements regarding architecture based assurance have already been covered when this document is published. Nevertheless, the remaining ones are still being worked on and will be finished by the release of the final AMASS Prototype P2.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AADL</td>
<td>Architecture Analysis and Design Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>API</td>
<td>Application Programming Interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOSAR</td>
<td>AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNF</td>
<td>Backus-Naur Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSCU</td>
<td>Braking System Control Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CACM</td>
<td>Common Assurance and Certification Meta-model</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHESSML</td>
<td>CHESS Modelling Language</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Cyber Physical System</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Direct Current</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECSEL</td>
<td>Electronic Components and Systems for European Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELK</td>
<td>Eclipse Layout Kernel</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMF</td>
<td>Eclipse Modelling Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMFTA</td>
<td>EMF-based Fault-Tree Analysis Tool</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMEA</td>
<td>Failure Mode and Effects Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Fault Tree Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUI</td>
<td>Graphical User Interface</td>
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<td>HARA</td>
<td>Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>HTTP</td>
<td>Hypertext Transfer Protocol</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBD</td>
<td>Internal Block Diagram</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDE</td>
<td>Integrated Development Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMA</td>
<td>Integrated Modular Avionics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JU</td>
<td>Joint Undertaking</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTL</td>
<td>Linear Temporal Logic</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLP</td>
<td>Natural Language Processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARTE</td>
<td>Modelling and Analysis of Real Time and Embedded systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTL</td>
<td>Metric Temporal Logic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCRA</td>
<td>Othello Contracts Refinement Analysis</td>
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<td>OMG</td>
<td>Object Management Group</td>
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<td>OSLC</td>
<td>Open Services for Lifecycle Collaboration</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>OCRA System Specification</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>RQA</td>
<td>Requirement Quality Analyzer</td>
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<td>RSHP</td>
<td>RelationSHiP</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCC</td>
<td>Semantic Clusters</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCM</td>
<td>System Conceptual Model</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCV</td>
<td>Hierarchical Views</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMUT</td>
<td>System Model Under Test</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMV</td>
<td>Symbolic Model Verifier</td>
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<tr>
<td>SW</td>
<td>Software</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SysML</td>
<td>System Modelling Language</td>
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<tr>
<td>TARA</td>
<td>Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRL</td>
<td>Technology Readiness Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UML</td>
<td>Unified Modelling Language</td>
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<tr>
<td>V&amp;V</td>
<td>Verification and Validation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Work Package</td>
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<tr>
<td>XMI</td>
<td>XML Metadata Interchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xSAP</td>
<td>eXtended Safety Assessment Platform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References (*)


[6] AMASS D2.3 AMASS Reference Architecture (b), 29 September 2017

[7] AMASS D2.4 AMASS Reference Architecture (c), 4 June 2018


[10] AMASS D3.1 Baseline and requirements for architecture-driven assurance, 30 September 2016


[16] AMASS D3.3 Design of the AMASS tools and methods for architecture-driven assurance (b), 30 March 2018


[18] AMASS D2.1 Business cases and high-level requirements, 28 February 2017

[19] AMASS D2.2 AMASS Reference Architecture (a), 30 November 2016


[21] AMASS D3.5 Prototype for Architecture-Driven Assurance (b), 29 September 2017


[23] AMASS D3.8 Methodological Guide for Architecture-Driven Assurance (b), 31 October 2018

[24] AMASS D4.3 Design of the AMASS tools and methods for multiconcern assurance (b), 30 April 2018

[25] AMASS D4.6 Prototype for multi-concern assurance (c), 31 August 2018

[26] AMASS D5.6 Prototype for seamless interoperability (c), 30 September 2018

[27] AMASS D7.3 open source platform project proposal, 31 January 2018

[28] AMASS D7.5 open source platform provisioning and website (a), 31 July 2017

[29] AMASS D7.6 open source platform provisioning and website (b), 31 March 2018