



AMASS

Architecture-driven, Multi-concern and Seamless Assurance and
Certification of Cyber-Physical Systems


AMASS Usage Scenario 2: Process & Product Configuration and Compliance Management

Second EAB Workshop
Västerås, Sept 17, 2018


Barbara Gallina, Ph.D.
WP6 Leader, T6.1-2 Leader, TM



Intro: Cross-&-Intra Domain Reuse -AREAS






- **Process/Product/Assurance Case Line Specification**
 - **Variability Management for Cross and Intra Domain reuse**
 - Process (P1) –families/line of processes
 - Product (P1, partly) –families/line of products
 - **Argumentation (P2)** –families/line of arguments
- **Measurement framework for Safety-oriented Process Line Engineering (SoPLE)**
- **Compliance management: further developed vision**
- **Argument fragments generation (Process and Product-based)**
 - **Towards fallacy-free process-based argumentation generation (P2)**
- **Semantics-based equivalent standards mapping**
- **Reuse assistant**
 - **Syntax-based Reuse Interface**
 - **Semantics-based Reuse Interface (P2)**




Assumptions

• Who am I in this scenario?


- A technical engineer having double expertise:
 - process engineering (process engineer)
 - product engineering (better a designer)
- Domain of expertise: space-related development processes and systems design
- Standards: ECSS
- My company produces families of systems
- >systematic reuse can be beneficial
- How I decide?
 - First, I embrace a measurement framework
 - Then, if positive, I adopt the approach



AMASS Goal: G1 & G2



O3: consolidate a *cross-domain and intra-domain assurance* reuse approach to improve mutual recognition agreement of compliance approvals and to help assess the return of investment of reuse decisions.




Measurement framework for SoPLE- SoPLE-targeted GQM Plus Strategies model

$$(a) SoC = \left| \bigcap_{1}^n C_{pi} \right| \quad (b) P_r R_i = \frac{SoC}{|C_{pi}|}$$

B. Gallina and S. Iyer. Towards Quantitative Evaluation of Reuse within Safety-oriented Process Lines.
 25th European & Asian Systems, Software & Service Process Improvement & Innovation (EuroSPI),
 Communications in Computer and Information Science, Springer, pp. 162-174, Bilbao, Spain, 5.-7. Sept. 2018.


Applying SoPLE-targeted GQM Plus Strategies model




As we had 6 common elements, **SoC computes to 6**. We have at least 4 single processes. The number of elements in the single processes for criticality levels A, B, C and D are 10 (f4 through f13), 10 (f4 through f13), 6 (f4, f5, f6, f9, f10 and f11) and 6 (f4, f5, f6, f9, f10 and f11) respectively. Thus, **PrR's for single processes A, B, C and D are computed as 0.6, 0.6, 1 and 1 respectively**.

B. Gallina and S. Iyer. Towards Quantitative Evaluation of Reuse within Safety-oriented Process Lines.
25th European & Asian Systems, Software & Service Process Improvement & Innovation (EuroSPI),
Communications in Computer and Information Science, Springer, pp. 162-174, Bilbao, Spain, 5.-7. Sept. 2018.

Let's go



Our DSL= X {UMA, CHESML, CACM-arg}






Base model = X-compliant model

Resolved model = X-compliant model

Orthogonal variability management-P1

Exemplification at Product Level

- Small GEO product line has two main configurations:
 - FAST with a combination of chemical and electrical propulsion
 - FLEX based on only electrical propulsion for both orbit transfer and station-keeping




$$(a) SoC = \left| \bigcap_{1}^n C_{pi} \right| \quad (b) P_r R_i = \frac{SoC}{|C_{pi}|}$$

BVR Realization editor

Discussion


Compliance management:

vision and current development –vision presented at ASCS-2018




B. Gallina, F. Ul Muram, and J. P. Castellanos Ardila. Compliance of Agilized (Software) Development Processes with Safety. Proceedings of the 4th international workshop on agile development of safety-critical software (ASCS), co-located with XP 2018, May 21st, Porto, Portugal, 2018.

Process&Product-based argument fragment generation –P1



F. UL Muram, B. Gallina and L. Gomez Rodriguez. Preventing Omission of Key Evidence Fallacy in Process-based Argumentations. 11th International Conference on the Quality of Information and Communications Technology (QUATIC), in press, Coimbra, Portugal, September 4-7, 2018




I. Sljivo, B. Gallina, J. Carlson, H. Hansson, S. Puri. Tool-Supported Safety-Relevant Component Reuse: From Specification to Argumentation. 23rd International Conference on Reliable Software Technologies (Ada-Europe), Lisbon, Portugal, June 18-22, 2018.

Second prototype (P1)

Other functionalities

Reuse assistant -P1



Equivalence Maps Editor

From

- Ref Framework Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-critical
- Ref Artefact Concept information
- Ref Artefact SW safety requirements specification
- Ref Artefact SW safety requirements specification
- Ref Artefact Validation Plan for SW aspects of system safety
- Ref Artefact E/E/PE system HW architecture design
- Ref Artefact SW architecture design
- Ref Artefact SW architecture integration test specification
- Ref Artefact SW/PE integration test specification
- Ref Artefact Support tools and coding standards
- Ref Artefact Selection of development tools
- Ref Artefact SW system design specifications
- Ref Artefact SW system integration test specification
- Ref Artefact SW module design specification
- Ref Artefact SW module test specification
- Ref Artefact Source code listening
- Ref Artefact Source code review report
- Ref Artefact SW module test results
- Ref Artefact Verified and tested sw modules
- Ref Artefact SW system integration test results
- Ref Artefact Verified and tested SW system
- Ref Artefact SW safety validation results
- Ref Artefact SW architecture integration test results
- Ref Artefact Programmable electronics integration test results
- Ref Artefact Verified and tested integrated programmable electronics
- Ref Artefact SW operation and modification procedures
- Ref Artefact SW modification request
- Ref Artefact SW modification impact analysis

Filtering

EM_62443-4-2vSEC61508.mapping

145-E-mapping

DC-Motor-SafetyCase.mapping

CS1-RTU.mapping

CS1-RTU-Security.mapping

Testing.mapping

Security Requirements for Safety-critical System.mapping

Test_forTAS.mapping

CEA_WPH_validation.mapping

Map Group

MG_JEC61508to62443-4-2

New Group

Filter Map Element

Artefact

Equivalence Map

EM_62443

New Map

ID

1

Name

EM_62443-4-2

Type

partial

Justification

The integrity checks used as security control in 62443-4-2 are applicable to avoid safety hazards

Map Justification

Concept from Standard A ("from") to be Mapped

To

- Ref Framework 62443-4-2 Technical security requirements for IACS components
- TAS-E-mapping
- Ref Artefact Risk and threat analysis
- Ref Artefact Vulnerability Analysis
- Ref Artefact SW safety requirements specification
- Ref Artefact Software integrity checks report

PostConditions

- Ref Activity 13-Overall safety validation
- Ref Activity 14-Overall operation, maintenance and repair
- Ref Activity 15-Overall modification and retrofit
- Ref Activity 16-Decommissioning or disposal
- Ref Artefact Concept information
- Ref Artefact E/E/PE system safety requirements
- Ref Artefact SW safety requirements specification
- Ref Artefact SW safety requirements specification
- Ref Artefact E/E/PE system HW architecture design
- Ref Artefact SW architecture integration
- Ref Artefact SW/PE integration test spec
- Ref Artefact Support tools and coding standards
- Ref Artefact Selection of development tools
- Ref Artefact SW system integration test results
- Ref Artefact SW system design specifications

Map Postconditions (Compliance Gaps)

Concept from Standard B ("to") to be Mapped

Reuse Assistant Window

Filtering

EM_62443-4-2vSEC61508.mapping

Map Group

MG_JEC61508to62443-4-2

Existing Equivalence Map

ID

1

Name

EM_62443-4-2

Type

partial

Justification

The integrity checks used as security control in 62443-4-2 are applicable to avoid safety hazards

PostConditions

New Obligations

ID

Name

Description

Reuse

Close

Source Project: /CS1-RTU-Security/ASSURANCE_PROJECT/CS1-RTU-Security.assuranceproj

Base Requirement CR7.2 Resource management

Base Requirement CR7.3 Control system backup

Base Requirement CR7.3(1) Backup verification

Base Requirement CR1.9(1) - ISO/IEC 19790 Level 3 security for public key authentic

Base Requirement CR1.9(2) ISO/IEC 19790 Level 4 security for public key authentic

Base Requirement CR1.14(1) ISO/IEC 19790 Level 3 security for symmetric keys

Base Requirement CR1.14(2) ISO/IEC 19790 Level 4 security for symmetric keys

Base Requirement CR2.8 - Auditable events

Base Requirement CR3.4 - Software and information integrity

Target Compliance Map

ID

1

Name

CM1

Type

full

Justification

This document covers fully the Standard requirements

Reusable Assurance Assets

Target Compliance Map

ID

3

Name

Cross Domain compliance 3

Type

full

Justification

Compliance generated automatically by Cross Domain

New Obligations

ID


Name

Description

Assurance Assets created as a Result of the Reuse


Third prototype (P2)

Process&Product-based argument fragment generation



Fallacy detection and process-based argument generation

Extending/Empowering MDSafeCer



F. UL Muram, B. Gallina and L. Gomez Rodriguez. Preventing Omission of Key Evidence Fallacy in Process-based Argumentations. 11th International Conference on the Quality of Information and Communications Technology (QUATIC), in press, Coimbra, Portugal, September 4-7, 2018

Fallacy detection and process-based argument generation

The screenshot displays a software development tool interface. On the left, a 'Library' pane shows a hierarchical tree of models. The 'compliance_modeling' folder is expanded, revealing 'ecss-e-st40c_requirements' (highlighted with a red box). Under 'Method Content', 'Content Packages' are listed, including 'requirements_of_software_design_and_implementation_5.5'. Within this package, 'Roles' are listed, including 'aocs_engineer' (highlighted with a green box). A green arrow points from 'aocs_engineer' in the tree to the right-hand pane. The right-hand pane shows the 'aocs_engineer' practice details. The title is 'Guidance (Practice): aocs_engineer (Extends 'requirement' in 'compliance_modeling')'. Under 'General Information', the 'Name' is 'aocs_engineer', the 'Presentation name' is 'AOCS Engineer', and the 'Type' is 'Practice'. The 'Brief description' states: 'AOCS engineer shall have the following experience and competencies: University degree in engineering; Several years of experience in the design, analysis and simulation of AOCS systems in different project phases,'. At the bottom of the library pane, 'mapping_requirements' and 'process_lifecycle' are also highlighted with red boxes.

- Capturing standard requirements
- Modelling process lifecycle
- Mapping standard requirements

Guidance (Practice): aocs_engineer (Extends 'requirement' in 'compliance_modeling')

General Information
Provide general information about this practice.

Name: aocs_engineer
Presentation name: AOCS Engineer
Type: Practice
Brief description: AOCS engineer shall have the following experience and competencies: University degree in engineering; Several years of experience in the design, analysis and simulation of AOCS systems in different project phases,

Fallacy detection and process-based argument generation

Modelling process lifecycle

Role: aocs_engineer

General Information
Provide general information about this role.

Name: aocs_engineer
Presentation name: AOCs Engineer
Brief description: Participation to project reviews (SRR, PDR, CDR), AOCs design, analyses and simulations, AIV/AIT support (test benches, review of test plans and test results), Sensors and actuators

Guidance (Practice): aocs_engineer (Contributes to 'aocs_engineer' in 'ecss-e-st40c requirements')

Content Elements
Specify the content elements referenced by this practice.

Content elements:
aocs_engineer, process_lifecycle/organization

Mapping standard requirements

Add...
Remove
☒ Manual order within type
Up

Description **References** Preview

Fallacy detection and process-based argument generation

Presentation Name	Index	Predecessors	Model In...	Type	Planned
ECSS-E-ST-40_Planning_Phase_Software_Design_and_Implementation	0			Delivery Process	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ECSS-E-40_Planning_Process	1			Capability Pattern	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
design of software items	2			Phase	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
coding and testing	29			Phase	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Develop and Document Software Units	30			Activity	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Development and Documentation of Software Units	31			Task Descriptor	<input type="checkbox"/>
Test Software Units	32			Activity	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
integration	36			Phase	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

al font items represent inherited relationships
; Bold italic ones inherited relationships from

Add...
Add from Process...
Remove

Fallacy detection and process-based argument generation

ECSS-E-ST-40_Software_Design_and_Implementation_Planing

Presentation Name	Model Info	Team	Type	Planned	Multipl...	Optional
ECSS-E-ST-40_Planing_Phase_Software_Design_and_Implementation			Delivery Process	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ECSS-E-40_Planing_Process			Capability Pattern	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
design of software items			Phase	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
coding and testing			Phase	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Develop and Document Software Units			Activity	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
AOCS AIT Engineer			Role Descriptor	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
AOCS Engineer			Role Descriptor	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
AOCS SW Architect			Role Descriptor	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
AOCS SW V&V Manager			Role Descriptor	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Development Team Leader			Role Descriptor	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Test Software Units			Activity	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
integration			Phase	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Description | Work Breakdown Structure | Team Allocation | Work Product Usage | Consolidated View

Properties | Problems | Console

Fallacy Detection Console


Certification against following ROLES are INSUFFICIENT:

1. AOCS ENGINEER
DETECTED FALLACIES: Certifications against following competencies/requirements are omitted:
 - University degree in engineering
 - Several years of experience in the design, analysis and simulation of AOCS systems in different project phases, Exce
 - Working experience with Linux System, Matlab and Satsim.RECOMMENDATION: Add skill certifications against above omitted evidence for the AOCS Engineer role to achieve sufficiency or provide rationale for its omission.
2. DEVELOPMENT TEAM LEADER
DETECTED FALLACIES: Certifications against following competencies/requirements are omitted:
 - Management of Electra AOCS SW development team
 - Working with Matlab/Simulink
 - Knowledge of design analysis and design test methodologies
 - Good analytical and problem-solving skills.RECOMMENDATION: Add skill certifications against above omitted evidence for the Development Team Leader role to achieve sufficiency or provide rationale for its omission.

Certification against following ROLES are SUFFICIENT:


3. AOCS AIT ENGINEER
4. AOCS SW ARCHITECT
5. AOCS SW V&V MANAGER

Fallacy detection and process-based argument generation




Discussion

Compliance checking + patterns



J. P. Castellanos Ardila and B. Gallina. Formal Contract Logic Based Patterns for Facilitating Compliance Checking against ISO 26262. Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on Technologies for Regulatory Compliance co-located with the 30th International Conference on Legal Knowledge and Information Systems (JURIX 2017), CEUR Workshop Proceedings, Vol-2049, pp. 65-72, Luxembourg, Luxembourg, 13 of December, 2017.

Automated Compliance Checking Vision




J. P. Castellanos Ardila and B. Gallina and F. UI Muram. Enabling Compliance Checking against Safety Standards from SPEM 2.0 Process Models. 44th Euromicro Conference on Software Engineering and Advanced Applications (SEAA), Prague, Czech republic, 29-31 August, 2018.




J. P. Castellanos Ardila and B. Gallina and F. UI Muram. Transforming SPEM 2.0-compatible Process Models into Models Checkable for Compliance. 18th International SPICE Conference (SPICE), Thessaloniki, Greece, October 9-10, 2018.

Automated Compliance Checking Vision

EPF Composer Modeling Capabilities



EPF Composer Customization

EPF Composer	Compliance Information	Suggested Icons
Reusable Asset	Rule Set	
Concept	Compliance Effect	
Custom category	Standard requirement	

AMASS Version of the Standards Mapping Method

Standards requirements

Lifecycle elements

Annotated Process

Automated Compliance Checking Vision

Plugin modeling

Rules formalization [Castellanos2017]

8.4.2 To ensure that the software unit design captures the information necessary to allow the subsequent development activities to be performed correctly and effectively, the software unit design shall be described using the notations listed in Table 7.

$$r_3 : \text{performSpecifySwUnit} \Rightarrow [O] \text{selectMandatoryNotationsforSwDesign}$$
$$r'_3 : \text{provideRationaleForNotSelectMandatoryNotationsforSwDesign} \Rightarrow [P] \text{-selectMandatoryNotationsforSwDesign}$$

$r'_3 > r_3$

Custom Categories

Standard Requirements ISO 26262 Software Unit Design

R1. Address software unit design process

r1.1 Address software unit design process

addressSwUnitDesignProcess

R2. Specify software units

r2.1. Complete requirements for specifying software units

performProvideSwArchitecturalDesign

performProvideSwSafetyRequirements

performSpecifySoftwareUnit

r2.2. Incomplete requirements for specify software units

-performSpecifySoftwareUnit

R3. Describe software unit specification

r3.1 Strict software unit specification description

selectMandatoryNotationsforSwDesign

r3.2. Taylored software unit specification description

provideRationaleForNotSelectMandatoryNotationsforSwDesign

-selectMandatoryNotationsforSwDesign

Rule Set - ISO 26262-Software Unit Design

Standards requirements

Process Elements

Method Content

Content Packages

Process Elements

Roles

Tasks

Design Software Unit

Specify software unit design

Start Software Unit Design Process

Work Products

Software Architectural Design

Software Safety Requirements

Software Unit Design

Lifecycle elements

Task: Start Software Unit Design Process

Relationships

Inputs

Mandatory:

Software Architectural Design

Software Safety Requirements

Software Unit Design Process > Start Software Unit Design Process

Process Usage

More Informa


Effects

addressSoftwareUnitDesignAndImplementationPhase

performProvideAssociatedSoftwareSafetyRequirements

performProvideSoftwareArchitecturalDesign

Annotated Process




Automated Compliance Checking Vision

Regorous report

Compliance Check Results: Process is non-compliant.


Description: Unfulfilled obligation to 'selectMandatoryNotationsForSwDesign' (Achievement, non-pre-emptive, non-persistent).

Element name: Specify Software Unit.





Discussion

Anti-Sisyphus via UMA, CHESSML, CACM and BVR




B. Gallina. 2015. Towards Enabling Reuse in the Context of Safety-Critical Product Lines. In 5th IEEE/ACM International Workshop on Product Line Approaches in Software Engineering, PLEASe 2015, Florence, Italy, 15–18 May 19, 2015

- The process, product and argumentation models can be linked to enable
 - impact analysis
 - process engineers, designers and assurance managers to work separately



Reuse discovery

IoT: Internet Of Tools



Knowledge-centric Systems Engineering

OSLC KM:

Represent any type of system artefact


&

Access any (delegated) operation


Metadata

Contents

Services
&
Operations




...to support...




...interoperability...

Knowledge Management processes



Reuse discovery and selection

A shape: System Representation language



A set of reuse operations on top of the industrial knowledge graph...



Index



Mapping & Merge



Search




Filter



Access & Share

Operation	URI Template
Base URI/prefix	http://www.reusecompany.com/oslc/km/operations
Search artifact	<code><base_uri>/sas/search</code> Query params: <code>query={text}</code> Body params: <code>srl={srl content}</code>
Filter	<code><base_uri>/sas/filter</code> -Similar to query capabilities -Similar to LinkedIn: <code>{(key=value,)+}</code>

Interplay of the functionalities -Reuse assistant perspective



Thank you for your attention!



Any questions 

